krici vs. jinvi

[Logical Language Group <cbmvax!uunet!pucc.princeton.edu!lojbab>]

I did this earlier, but in the context of attitudinal discussion.
Belief is something you can have without any evidence or justrification.
I can believe a lot of things without holding an opinion on them.
Opinion is some kind of rationalized (or maybe irrationalized depending
on your opinion of the other guy's opinion %^) concept.  I see opinions as
closer to ideas - they are thought about, questioned, etc.  Beliefs are
less thought about.

Jihn Cowan has poproposed separately that jinvi needs an x3 place for grounds/
justification, given my definition.  I'm inclined to agree, and this would add
another example set to the gismu collections that differ most significant;ly
in place structure as opposed to inherent meaning.
So how about:
jinvi  x1 holds opinion x2/thinks x2 true  on grounds x3
krici  x1 believes x2
djuno  x1 knows fact x2 about subject x3 by epistemology x4

Hmm.  Parallelism requires jinvi and krici to have 'about ...' places,
so if parallelism is used, these need to be added.  In usage

I have opinions about politics.
I have beliefs about God.

Not having the other lists posted recently at my fingertips, let me identfy
a couple of significant pairs of gismu that may not have been mentioned.

x1 is a fact (in the absolute - independent of epistemology)
(fatci
jetnu x1 is true under epistemology x2
jitfa x1 is false under epistemology x2

datni (data) is also related:
x1 is data about x2 for use x3
but not as closely.

Now looking at these place structures, I can see that my intent is that
you hold jinvi about truth; you krici about fact.  Truth is relative;
fact at least theoretically, is absolute.  (By definition - let's not get into
philosophical arguments:  'fatci' is that which is independent of observer/
epistemology, etc.; the set of facts may be the null set in your belief)

Any help, or have I just muddied the waters again?

By the way, I consider the question about place structure to be one that any
Lojbanist is qualified to weigh in on.  This is an explicit example of when
'lojbab doesn't decide' or 'pull rank'.  Only if no agreement can be reached
as a consensus will >I< be the one to decide.

----
lojbab = Bob LeChevalier, President, The Logical Language Group, Inc.
         2904 Beau Lane, Fairfax VA 22031-1303 USA
         703-385-0273
         lojbab@grebyn.com

NOTE THAT THIS IS A NEW NET ADDRESS AND SUPERSEDES OTHERS IN MY POSTINGS
            OR LOGICAL LANGUAGE GROUP, INC. PUBLICATIONS