Empson's seven types of ambiguity

[John Cowan <cbmvax!UUNET.UU.NET!snark.thyrsus.com!cowan>]

1.  We don't know which of the various things said or implied by an utterance
ought to be taken as the salient point intended by the speaker.

2.  When multiple meanings of a word or phrase can be fused into a single
whole, we don't know which individual meaning should be given the most
prominence.

3.  When a word or phrase has two unconnected meanings, we don't know which
meaning is intended to be most prominent, but we gain a third meaning -- the
meta-meaning that a pun was intended.

4.  When a word or phrase has two alternative meanings, we don't know which
meaning is intended to be most prominent, but we may gain the sense of a
complexity of meaning in the speaker which no single meaning could express.

5.  When the speaker is changing his mind in the course of utterance, or
discovering his own meaning in the course of utterance, we find a word or
phrase which connects completely neither with the former meaning nor the
latter meaning, but falls between them.

6.  When a statement is a tautology, a contradiction, or an irrelevancy,
we don't know what was meant and are forced to invent a significance.

7.  When the two meanings of a statement express opposites, we discern a
fundamental division in the speaker's mind causing him to hold two contrary
views simultaneously.

--
cowan@snark.thyrsus.com         ...!uunet!cbmvax!snark!cowan
                e'osai ko sarji la lojban