Re: ago24 & replies

[jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU]

And:
> I now think that "be important" in the sense of "matter" ought always
> to have an irrealis x1, and for the reasons I've outlined, I
> think only duhu can be irrealis. [I fully realize that I'm probably
> igniting a new thread in saying this, & fully hadn't intended to.]

But can't an object be important then?

> > Even if we can't agree on nitcu specifically. Do you think that there
> > is (or should be) certain tersumti that accept _exclusively_ irrealis
> > events?
> I think there should be certain tersumti that accept exclusively
> irrealis sumti: i.e. le+anything,

I hope you are not saying that irrealissness and nonveridicality are
the same thing!

> or {lo bridi}

Isn't that an object? Can you say {mi nitcu lo bridi}, meaning that
you need that what certain bridi says be true?

> or {lV duhu}.
> English transitive BELIEVE is like that.

Lojban {krici} also has a (du'u) in the x2. No problem with that one.

> I don't have any intuitions on the relationship between (ir)realis and
> genericity. In a sense I think generics are purely mental objects, and
> so are neither realis nor irrealis.

Aren't irrealis events purely mental objects as well?

> That is, ontologically, lohe mlatu
> is not a cat but a conceptual cat-archetype;

Agreed.

> but properties ascribed
> to lohe mlatu as a sumti are understood to be properties not of the
> conceptual archetype but of instances of the archetype.

I don't agree with this, but then my idea of {lo'e} is not the standard
one. I don't think that any instance of the archetype need exhibit the
property. A claim about the archetype is a claim only about the archetype
and the other objects that are claimed to be in a relationship with it.

> {Lohe nu}
> is not an actual event, but nor is it a potential event, or an event
> such that we don't know whether it happens.

No. It is the archetype of all those events.

> And I'm not comfortable with a cat being irrealis - as I've said, I
> think the (ir)realis distinction is a property only of propositions.

A cat is not irrealis, the archetype of a cat is (or could be, I'm still
playing with this idea). If only propositions can be irrealis, what do
you call the event described by an irrealis proposition?

> Also, to me (and nothing from LLG leads me to
> think I'm right on this) {lohe} is like a default universal quantifier.

To me it is nothing of the sort (nothing from LLG leads me to
believe that I'm right either). If you want {ro} or {so'e}, why would
you use {lo'e}?

> So if {lohe mlatu cu xekri} then a white cat is an exceptional, atypical
> cat.

Why wouldn't you just say {so'e mlatu cu xekri} for that?

> Say my views on {lohe} prevail: then it would work for "I want
> to go" translated as {mi djica lohe nu mi klama}, since it would not
> be true that the typical event of my going is wanted by me - e.g. it
> is not claiming that if I don't want the event of my going for a walk
> on May 5 1971 then that event is atypical.

And what would it mean that the event is atypical?

To me {mi djica lo'e nu mi klama} means that {mi} and {lo'e nu mi klama}
are in relationship {djica}, so I am in relationship {djica} with the
archetype of events of I go. There is no claim about any particular event
of me going.

> The way I'd now say "I want to go" is {mu djica le duhu mi klama}, with
> "djica" meaning "want x2 to be the case", and with implicit ca tense
> on klama.

That would be redefining djica, but I guess it is possible (although
as I said, I don't like it).

> One reason not to like it is that it invalidates vast quantities of
> established usage.

Yes, but in any case, whatever we conclude I am fairly sure that it will
be ignored by usage. People (me included) will say {mi djica le nu klama}
no matter how wrong we think that is. So we may safely ignore usage in
this respect.

> Another reason not to like it is that the relevant
> gismu need to be reglossed. {Cumki} goes from "x1 is possible" to
> (if we're being ultra clear) "it is possible that it the case that
> there is an x1".

Yes, I think this is at least in part why I don't like it. I think that
nitcu an object, djica an object, an object vajni, etc are very useful
selbri. Requiring them to be (du'u) would mean that an object can't go
in those places.

> My reason for liking it is that it seems to be right
> logically.

Yes but at the cost of losing things like "I need this book".

> I can blearily see one logical inconvenience with my proposal.
> This is the uniqueness of propositions. You'd generally have
> to use overt tense indicators. There is exactly one {duhu mi
> klama} (which is why I wish duhu didn't need a descriptor, or
> could be {li duhu mi klama}, with {li} labelling uniques),

I'm quite happy with {le} for uniques. In most cases it labels
a unique thing (the one you have in mind), and even when it doesn't
label one single thing, it labels many things taken individually.

> and
> it happens to be true. To say "I need to go", I would have to
> say {mi nitcu le duhu mi ba klama}.

Or {mi ca klama} if you are already going as you say it. But still,
I don't think it is necessary to explicitly use the tense any more
than all the other places of klama.

> In fact, I rather fear that might not work. Consider {troci}:
> {koha pu troci le duhu koha klama} (koha tried to make it the case
> that koha goes). If koha had previously gone, then {koha klama}
> would already be true. So we need a tense on klama meaning
> "after the trying", "thereafter", {ba *tense of superordinate bridi*}.

I'm not sure I see the problem. What if koha had previously gone but
somewhere else than zohe, or by some other route, why is the tense more
important than these implicits?

As an aside, how do the tenses of subordinate bridi behave? Are they
absolute, or do they refer to the main bridi?

> I am inclined to accept the view that (on grounds of utility) {nitcu}
> should be a (post-sumti-raising) relationship between two objects.
> But I hold that this would rule out opaque or irrealis readings.

I'm still willing to use {lo'e} for those.

Jorge