Re: replies re. ka & mamta be ma

[jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU]

And:
> > > It is legitimate to hope for a reasonable match between one's
> > > world view and that modelled by the language one is using.
> > Does this mean that there are ideas expressable in some language
> > and unexpressable in another?
> I believe so, though not very strongly, & don't want to argue the
> point. What I would claim is that if 2 lgs can express the same idea,
> but 1 lg takes 1 word to do so & the other takes 10000 words, then
> the pragmatic difference between the two expressions is so great that
> they don't feel like the same idea: one feels simple & the other
> complicated.

That's why I think {kau} is important. The reformulation using
10000 words just doesn't feel like the same idea.

> Ideally there is a fairly iconic relationship between
> sentences and mental representations of their meaning.
> This is speculative.

Highly.

> > I would argue that {kau} is in the same boat with {pa}. Your
> > argument against works just as well for {pa}:
> > > Here is my case against: Given a sentence S,
> > > from S can be derived a proposition, P, which constitutes part
> > > of the meaning of S. P can be represented using pred calc, & pred
> > > calc, in matters such as scope, quantification, variables, etc.,
> > > is a reasonable model of P as it is in our minds. {kau} (in its
> > > "indirect interrogative" use is merely a syntactic variant of
> > > {kau}-less circumlocution, since both variants come out the same
> > > when the S is translated into P done in prec calc.
> > Replace the last sentence with:
> > {pa} is merely a syntactic variant of a {pa}-less circumlocution,
> > since both variants come out the same when the S is translated into P
> > done in pred calc.
> If you're thinking of {le namcu pe le solri}, this is not true. "1"
> refers to 1 whatever the state of the universe is.

Here I was thinking of the logical substitution "exists x such that...
and for all y not equal to x it is false that..." or whatever the
correct translation is. I think all numbers can be replaced by
existentials. Of course, one of "for all" or "exists" is redundant
too. {roda} is equivalent to {naku su'oda naku}, and {su'oda} is
equivalent to {naku roda naku}, so one of them is just an add-on.

(Unless they are cognitive primitives? How do we tell?)

> > If the language is really a language for human comunication,
> > then there will be many ways, and the more complex the idea, the more ways
> > there will probably be to express it.
> How do you mean there *will* be many ways? I'm sure that what you say
> is true of any lg that ever gets used much. I don't think my hypothetical
> lg would be practical or convenient. Just adequate for expressing
> everything.

Ok, I think we are talking about different things.

If all you want is a language adequate for express everything, then aaaa
will do. (That's the name of the language). It has a minimal grammar, and
its vocabulary can grow as much as necessary to meet the needs of the
speaker.

Obviously you are imposing other conditions, and I think they must be
related to "practical" and "convenient", and I may agree with most of
them but I think they are absolutely subjective. I still don't see any
objective criterion that says that something is basic and something else
is an add-on.

> > > I am assuming that sentences "expressing the same
> > > idea" are truth-conditionally equivalent.
> > Do you consider {ko'a zmadu ko'e} and {ko'e mleca ko'a} truth-conditionally
> > equivalent?
> In principle, they could be. In practice, it depends on exactly what
> {zmadu} and {mleca} end up meaning when the lg gets known properly.
> > Do you allow semantics to determine truth-conditionality?
> I'm not sure I understand. I'd have thought it is precisely
> semantics, & only semantics, that determines truth-conditionality.

Not always. {mi e do klama} is truth-conditionally equivalent to
{mi klama ije do klama}, but this is independent of the semantics.
They are sintactically truth-conditionally equivalent.

I too was talking about a more general "same meaning", but I don't
see how you can make an assertion about "truth-conditionality" in
the mleca/zmadu case, since as you say, their meaning is determined
pragmatically. In the same sense, how can you say that the logical
expansion of {kau} is really truth-conditionally equivalent to kau?
Shouldn't we wait and see what it ends up meaning in practice?

> > Dismissing {kau} affects the grammar because [...]
> > (b) the lexeme-specific
> > and complicated rules for deriving semantic structure from syntactic
> > structure containg {kau} could be scrapped.
> > As for (b), if scrapping the semantico-syntactic rules relevant to {kau}
> > simplifies the grammar, so would doing the same thing with respect to {pa}.
> There aren't any semantico-syntactic rules specific to {pa}, apart
> from the one teenyweeny rule that says {pa} means "1".

Right. Because you've decided that "1" is an indivisible atom of meaning.
Of course, if that is your assumption, then {pa} can't be dismissed.

Jorge