Re: ago24 & replies

[ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>]

Jorge:
> I don't think it is fair to say that le+anything can be an irrealis
> event. It may be true, but it doesn't say much. You could just as
> well have mentioned {ko'a} as a possible irrealis sumti.

{koha} could indeed be a possible irrealis sumti, and I could have
mentioned it.

> > I'm not clear what an object is. At any rate, surely {lo bridi} refers
> > to a bridi, just as {lo duhu} does.
> The gi'uste seems to say that {lo bridi} is a selcusku, a sedu'u rather
> than a du'u. That's what I meant by an object.

My gihuste says "x1 (du'u) is a predicate". Is this out of date?

> > I see generics as analogous to (intensionally defined) sets: the
> > set has properties and the members have common properties.
> But the properties of the set have nothing to do with the properties
> of the members (common or otherwise). The set of white objects is not
> white, even though all its members are.
> On the other hand, the properties of the archetype do have to do with
> the properties of the instances, even if they are not always the same
> ones.

I don't agree that the properties of the archetype have to do with
the properties of the instances. To me, {lohe mlatu cu xekri} means
"typical instances of the cat archetype are black", but not "the
cat archetype is black". I don't know of any way to attribute properties
to the cat archetype rather than its instances.

> > It simply
> > has to be stipulated whether {lohe broda cu brode} means the "set"
> > is a brode (your preference), or whether it means the "members" are
> > brode (my preference, and the present norm).
> I don't know why you say it's my preference. {lo'e brode} is not a set.
> It's not true that {lo'i mlatu cu mlatu} = "the set of cats is a cat".
> I don't see the analogy.
> On the other hand, it is true that {lo'e mlatu cu mlatu} = "the typical
> cat is a cat", a property that the archetype shares with all the
> instances.

"typical instances of the cat archetype are cats", not "the cat archetype
is a cat". This is the reason for the set analogy.

> But it is also true that {mi pensi lo'e mlatu} = "I think
> about the typical cat", a property that the archetype doesn't share
> with any of the instances, since now I am not thinking of any (what
> was the word?) extramental cats (it sounds so close to excremental).

["I find the world extramentally excrementally disillusioning" - from
my big poem.]

We are now discussing lohe mlatu qua "set" - we're concerned not with
properties of cats, whether all cats or just ones that are typical
instances of the cat archetype, but with properties of archetypes.

> I suppose you couldn't say {mi pensi lo'e mlatu} with your definition.

It would mean "the typical instance of the cat archetype is thought
about by me". Indeed not the meaning you wished to express.

> What does your definition allow us to say that can't be conveyed by
> {so'e mlatu}, even if they are not truth-conditionally equivalent?

You answer it here:

> > What sort of properties does an archetype
> > (as opposed to its instances) have?
> I can think about {lo'e mlatu}, I can need {lo'e mlatu}, I can want
> {lo'e mlatu}, I can look for {lo'e mlatu}, all without there being
> a single {lo mlatu} with those properties.

You don't look for or need the archetype. You look for a typical
instance of the archetype, which, as you say, needn't exist.
I suspect we agree after all, so long as you agree that we are
not now discussing lahe lu lohe mlatu lihu, but rather
le duhu kau du lihu lu lohe mlatu lihu. [NB placatory {kau}.]

I would still hold that {lohe} implies universal quantification:
 mi nitcu lohe mlatu
 Ax x is a typical instance of the cat archetype -> I need x

> > > > So if {lohe mlatu cu xekri} then a white cat is an exceptional, atypical
> > > > cat.
> > > Why wouldn't you just say {so'e mlatu cu xekri} for that?
> > One reason is that this is a statement of objective fact: you can test
> > it by inspecting the extramental world.
> I think {so'e} is subjective. You can't test it only by inspecting the
> extramental world.

Sure you can. Tell me what fraction counts as {sohe} and I'll go out
and test the world. On the other hand, if we agree that the typical
englishman has a stiff upper lip, and we go and inspect the world
and find no englishman with a stiff upper lip, we can say "Well,
no englishman is a typical englishman", and our views about typical
englishmen aren't falsified.

> > The implicit sumti are present in the duhu/proposition if not in the
> > seduhu/sentence. If the tense is not in the seduhu then it's not in
> > the duhu.
> Is that true?

I believe it true because that's what my reason told me, not because
that's what LLG told me.

> I always thought that the tenses could be understood
> from context.

Yes, but only pragmatically, or so the truth conditions of the duhu
of the seduhu are affected?

> In any case, even if the tense is given, that doesn't
> fix the exact time, so I don't see much difference. If I say
> {ko'a cusku le sedu'u ko'a ba klama} = "she said she will come",
> I am talking about a particular time in the future, not about any
> time in the future, so saying the {ba} explicitly or not doesn't
> really change much.

Good point. This would be fixed if all or most gismu automatically
came with an event place fillable by zohe.

> > This would not be so if, as I would advocate, every or
> > at least most selbri had event sumti.
> I really don't see the relationship of this with the tenses.

The tense of broda is the time at which le nu broda occurs.
If there were a sumti place (tersumti) for the event, then it
could be filled by a specific or non-specific (implicit) sumti.

---
And