On {lo} and existence

["John E. Clifford" <pcliffje@CRL.COM>]

        jorge:
        The problem is not with {lo} or {da poi}, the problem is how
        you define the selbri {pavyseljirna}. Once we are clear on  that,
        then
        it becomes clear that {lo pavyseljirna} and {da poi pavyseljirna} refer
        to the same thing, just like {lo gerku} and {da poi gerku} refer to
        the same thing. Whether the thing they refer to is a real life beast
        or a mythological character depends on the definition of
        {pavyseljirna}.

        pc:
        Ahah! now I see (again, I think) the situation about _lo_ and _da
        poi_.  _da_poi_ does not refer to anything, it is a quantifier
        phrase, a syncategorematic, a piece of logical appratus, not a
        content expression.  _lo_ phrases do refer to things, they are
        descriptions on a par with _le_ descriptions and the like.  Now
        the relation between the two (as a first approximation, at least)
        is this: if _lo_broda_ does refer to something then
        _da_poi_broda_ is not a vacuous quantification and conversely.
        The principle problem is to figure out in a given case which
        broda _lo_broda_ refers to, since this is not determined in any
        official (nor probably in any general) way (barring a good Gri-
        cean rule -- which there never seem to be when you need 'em).
        Typically, it does not matter whether we pin the reference down
        further than the context already forces us to and, if it does, we
        can move over to various specific and/or definite expressions to
        do the needed additional work.  Depending upon what we decide to
        do about sentences containing non-referring descriptions (assum-
        ing that we can have some of these), this may make _lo_ sentences
        and _da_poi_ sentences materially equivalent (true and false
        together) but does not mean that they mean the same thing. I
        suspect they are not even true and false together either, though.

        I would say, on the other hand,  that the definition of _pavysel-
        jirna_ is fixed, that there are some and that they do not exist
        in the realm of terrestrial biology but that they do exist in the
        domain of European (and Chinese? or is that dragons?) mythology.
        I suppose it is to say things like that that _zasti_ has that
        place, but quantifiers (and descriptors, I think) range more
        freely -- in languages, if not in logic (and in logic too when
        the puritans aren't looking).

        jorge:
        Talking about imaginary things is talking about imaginary things.
        It makes as much sense to say that all unicorns (characters) have
        one horn, as to say that all numbers (abstract objects) are less than
        some other number.In both cases we are talking about abstract
        objects, to which we assign properties by convention.

        pc:
        Unicorns are not abstract, even if numbers are and even if uni-
        corns do not exist. Unicorns are pretty much like horses, except
        for the horn and some details about hooves. tail and beard. And
        this is no more conventional than any other word is (less so than
        many, since the name and the horn attribute are naturally con-
        nected).  Our idea of a unicorn is also not abstract, though it
        may be non-physical.  Our concept of a unicorn is abstract, like
        all concepts.  But these latter two are not unicorns, even if
        physical unicorns do not exist -- or even if they do.

        jorge:
        Those statements don't cause trouble because they are quantified
        by {ro}."All elves are humanoid" can be true even if there are no
        elves, and can also be part of a definition even if there are no
        elves.

        pc:
        Whoa! if the quantification is _ro_da_poi_broda_ or just plain
        _ro_broda_ then it does entail that there are broda; we set it up
        that way.  The only "All elves" that does not is whatever has
        become of _ro_da_kanoi_da_<elf>_ki_ and that is because of
        _kanoi_, not _ro_ (and even it implies the rather wimpy _da_
        _kanoi_ etc.).
        Besides, for definitions we have _lo'e_ (or whatever "the typi-
        cal" is), which has all essential properties and an average value
        for all non-essential ones.

        jorge:
        > lojbab:
        > But I do NOT want to assume that a "lo" description is implying
        > the real existance of the thing described.

        It doesn't, just as {da} shouldn't either. They imply existence
        of referent. What are acceptable referents is determined by what
        the speakers of the language accept as brodas. (In the case of
        "unicorn"in English, most of us would accept them as mythological
        characters, existing as mythological characters, thus lo unicorn
        is lo mythological character unicorn, and not lo real breathing
        flesh and blood unicorn, and we have no problem with assigning
        properties to mythological characters as mythological
        characters.)

        pc:
        We are awfully close here and I think we may be able to formulate
        the common elements into a clear statement.  I disagree only that
        _pavyseljirne_ has two different definitions, under one of which
        they exist and under the other not, and hold instead that the
        same facts are explained by the domain place on _zasti_, which
        (it now appears) has nothing to do with _da_.
pc>|83