Re: On {lo} and existence

[jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU]

And:
> > > The process is analogous to deciding whether {le nanmu cu ninmu}
> > > is true. First the hearer must ascertain who {le nanmu} refers to.
> > Exactly. What you suggest in practice is that {lo} is nonspecific
> > nonveridical. I think that goes against the canon.
> I don't see why it's nonveridical. On the contrary: {lo broda} makes
> an implicit claim that the referent really is a broda, rather than
> merely being described as such.

It comes to the same thing. "Being described as a broda" is the same
as "really is a broda in the universe of my description". Everything
"really is a broda" in some universe, so allowing {lo broda} to refer
to brodas of any universe is tantamount to letting it be nonveridical.

>  In universe U Ex is my wings, & in universe R I described x
>  In universe U Ex is my wings, & in universe R I drew-a-pic-of x

Of course, that means that x exists (in the quantificational sense) in
both universes. Otherwise, the second claim is meaningless.
So, it really means

Ex, in U x is my wings, & in R I drew-a-pic-of x

I prefer to avoid the introduction of unnecessary entities, and
instead of saying "in U x is my wings", I can say "in R x is
my imaginary wings", which is not {lo mi nalci}.

I prefer to see imaginary things as imaginary things of this universe,
rather than as real things of other universes. The concept of "other
universes" is totally unnecessary for our semantic theory.
(The concept of "imaginary" is already a predicate, I don't see
the need to make it a metapredicate.)

> > > > You can't say "I don't have wings, but they are very pretty".
> > > That's right. It's only certain things like describees that don't
> > > have to exist in the same universe as the universe in which the
> > > main predication obtains.
> > I think that's sumti raising in disguise.
> You may be right. How would you unraise draw-a-pic-of?

You have to explain the predicate better. "Take a photograph of" is
clearly not a problem, the object is a real object. For drawing
a picture, the case is the same if the x2 is the model. If the
model x2 is not a really-is broda but a generic or somesuch, then
don't use {lo}.

> > > > > If they can't both be true, then {lo nu} must denote something
> > > > > that really happens. That would be very inconvenient.
> > > > Unless {nu <bridi>} means "x1 is a potential event of <bridi>".
> > > > Potential in R, independently of whether it happens or not in some U.
> > > You'd have to explain to me how one ascertains whether something
> > > is potential.
> > For every <bridi>, {da poi nu <bridi>} is defined as a potential event.
> > A potential event can happen, in which case it is an actual event,
> > or never happen, in which case it remains a potential event only.
> > (I don't like to define {nu} this way, I'm just trying to justify
> > it's use for irrealis events).
> How do I ascertain whether something is a potential event if it is of
> the never-happening variety?

_Every_ {nu <bridi>} would be a potential event. There's nothing to ascertain.
It's just a definition. All I'm saying is that {lo'i nu <bridi>} is not
the empty set for any <bridi>. What you call {nu <bridi>}, be it "potential
event" or something else is not important.

I would prefer that {nu <bridi>} be an actual event, but allowing it
to always have a referent that satisfies it should not commit us to
do the same for every broda.

> > > > But I agree that {lo nu} should denote something that really happens.
> > > > Unfortunately, usage probably will decide against that.
> > > This, you will realize, is why I, having originally taken the same
> > > position as you, have elected to support the opposing view.
> > My problem is with your extension of this inconvenience to objects.
> > To let {lo nu klama} be an event that never happens is bad enough,
> > but to let {lo mlatu} be something that is never a cat is too much
> > for me.
> "Never" in this universe. Not in other universes.
>
> What you call an extension of an inconvience, I call transforming
> inconsistency into consistency.

Yes, but what you throw away in the process is too much for my taste.

> The alternative route to consistency
> is to require {dahi} for nu that don't necessarily ever happen.

Or not to define {nu} as "actual event of <bridi>" but as something
else. The {da'i} can be stuck to the {nu} instead of to the {lo}.

> Or
> we can let the inconsitency stand, with {nu} by default exceptionally
> being {dahi nu}, and all other selbri defaulting to {dahinai broda}.

Why by exception? Is {xanri} by exception a {da'i broda}? It's just
a different definition of {nu}, not an exception to anything.

> Any of these three is okay by me.

My first choice would be that {nu broda} be a real event of brodaing.
I can accept it being a potential event of brodaing, but I'd hate to
let {lo broda} be anything other than a this-world broda.
("This world" being the world in which the discourse takes place.)

Jorge