Re: On {lo} and existence

[ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>]

Jorge:
> > > You seem to be saying that the meaning of a predicate depends on context,
> > > which is very true for natlangs. I suppose it will be true for Lojban as
> > > well.
> > I don't think I'm saying this. At least not if we're using a
> > truth-conditional rather than psychological model of semantics.
> I'm lost again. Are there propositions independently of there being
> a world (or worlds)?

I guess so. They're like numbers. They just exist. There are no conditions
on their existence, and so no circumstances under which a given proposition
does not exist.

> Consider a simple sentence: {da blanu}. How can you associate a proposition
> to it unless you know the meaning of the word "blanu"? How can this word
> have meaning without there being a world out there (with real and imaginary
> components) with things that satisfy the predicate or don't?

Am I saying otherwise?

> You talk of "proposition634" as if it had a referent outside the world,
> but to me the world consists of all referents, so the referent of
> "proposition634" cannot be outside of it, by definition of world. Are you
> using a more restricted definition of "world"?

I don't think of a proposition having a referent. It's more like a
state of affairs, an it-being-the-case-that-p. It's not a kind of
sentence. And I am using a more restricted definition of "world" than
you - a world contains only real things. But I don't think that makes
much difference, for while you say no proposition can be outside *the*
world, I would say no proposition is outside every world. If you're
happier merging my infinite multiplicity of worlds into one, that's okay.

> How do you determine whether a referent is or is not in the world?

You inspect the only-real world.

> In your proposition true(prop23, world73, 1), are the referents of
> "prop23" and "world73" in the same world?

They don't have referents. Prop23 is in world73.

Lest it is not dazzlingly obvious, I shd point out that I am pretty much
making most of this stuff up as I go along (tho it nonetheless makes sense
to me). I'm not bringing to bear long hours or years of thought on the
question, and nor am I bringing to bear much more than short minutes
of reading on the question. I share the fairly mainstream view that
as far as psychologically real accounts of meaning go, truth-conditionality
is a sometimes methodologically useful fiction, the philosophical
underpinnings of which aren't terribly important.

But, all that said, I'm happy to continue this thread.

---
And