Re: egality

[jorge@PHYAST.PITT.EDU]

And:
> >  I think that the idea is to use
> > the pattern "Everybody is X, but some are more X than others", which
> > makes perfect sense for some properties, but not for "equal".
> But it does make sense - e.g. "these lines are of equal length more
> than those lines are of equal length" - fine.

But that does not fit the pattern I proposed. "All these lines are
of equal length, but some of them are more of equal length than others".
Well, maybe it does make a little sense, meaning that some are closer
to the mode than others, and taking "equal" as "approximately equal".

But that is clearly not what Orwell meant. He meant "more equal"
suggesting "superior", which is not precisely closer to the mode. That
is how it works for properties that naturally have a scale, unlike
"equal". Things like "everybody is happy, but some are happier than
others", or "everybody is rich, but some are richer than others",
which do make sense.

> > In any case, you have to stretch "some are more equal than others"
> > in order to get it to mean that some are such that their equality to
> > another is more that that one's equality to the first. I just can't
> > get that meaning from "some are more equal than others".
>
> "The degree to which each member of group1 is equal to each other
> member is nearer to the "equal" end of the equality-inequality
> scale than the degree to which each member of group2 is equal
> to each other member of group2."

Ah, but that is not the meaning of your version! That could be the
meaning of my second sentence, if it didn't somewhat contradict the
first one, but it can't possibly be the meaning of your version, which
compares the equality of X and Y to that of Y and X.

Suppose we change to a two-place predicate where it does make sense
to say that one way exceeds the other way: X loves Y more than
Y loves X. But how do you fit that to the orwellian pattern?
"Everybody loves, but some love more than others". But that does not
mean that "everybody loves each other, but some love others more than
those others love them". Indeed, the ones that love the most could
also be the ones that are most loved, and that would still be fine
with the orwellian phrase, but not with your version.

> "On the surface" we have sounds. These correspond to words. And the
> words correspond to meanings. Only on the plane of meaning are there
> predicates, and this plane isn't on the surface. The construction
> means "all people are equal to each other".

We agree about that first sentence. My point is that for the _second
sentence_ to make sense, "equal" has to be taken as one-place, because
"more" is comparing some people to others, and not a relationship
going one way or the other way between a given pair of arguments.

> I maintain that "equality" must be suore place, but I accept that
> it is possible to define new predicates, e.g. you could have one
> place simklama meaning "x1 is a mass/set, one part/member of which
> is le klama, another part of which is le se klama, another part of
> which is le te klama,... etc.".

I don't understand what is it that you want to maintain about "equality".

(a) {dunli} is a suhore-place Lojban predicate.

(b) "equal" is never used as the English equivalent of a one-place
    predicate.

If you mean (a), then I agree, of course. If you mean (b), then
I disagree. Reciprocal predicates are just as valid as any other
predicate, and "equal" is used reciprocally in English. Sometimes
"equal" will be translated as "dunli" and sometimes as "dunsi'u".

> I think the logical workings should be out in the open, clear for
> all to see, reflected iconically in the syntax.

Ok, but then I don't agree that your version of explicit logic
reflects what Orwell's phrase says in English. I think that a closer
rendering might be:

        ro prenu ro prenu cu jikydunli
        i ku'i su'o prenu su'o prenu cu zmadu le ka [ke'a] jikydunli [da]

        Every person is equal to every person.
        But some person is more than some person in being equal
        (to someone).

But the problem with this is that it spoils the effect that the English
version has. The effect in English is achieved by treating a reciprocal
predicate, perfectly idiomatic in the first sentence, as if it was a
normal one place property, which is what the second sentence requires.

By decomposing the reciprocal predicate, the second sentence is no
longer a natural rejoinder to the first. Unless you give a translation
like yours, which is a natural rejoinder, but whose logic is different
than the one in English. Maybe this is what you were saying all along,
if so, sorry about all the nitpicking.

Jorge