egality etc

[ucleaar <ucleaar@UCL.AC.UK>]

Xorxes:
> > > the pattern "Everybody is X, but some are more X than others", which
> > > makes perfect sense for some properties, but not for "equal".
> > But it does make sense - e.g. "these lines are of equal length more
> > than those lines are of equal length" - fine.
> But that does not fit the pattern I proposed. "All these lines are
> of equal length, but some of them are more of equal length than others".
> Well, maybe it does make a little sense, meaning that some are closer
> to the mode than others, and taking "equal" as "approximately equal".
> That is how it works for properties that naturally have a scale, unlike
> "equal". Things like "everybody is happy, but some are happier than
> others", or "everybody is rich, but some are richer than others",
> which do make sense.

In English pretty well all non-scalar properties can be scalarized,
the scale being from asymptotically near to P to infinitely far from
P.

> But that is clearly not what Orwell meant. He meant "more equal"
> suggesting "superior", which is not precisely closer to the mode.

First, that's why my Lojban version says "X is more equal to Y than
Y is to X", which implies "equal" is asymmetric, perverted to
"superior:inferior". Second, if one group is deviates further from
the mean in length or social status then that entails that some members
of the group are superior to others. You can read Orwell's epigram
as saying "All animals are equal, but equality is a matter of degree".

> > "The degree to which each member of group1 is equal to each other
> > member is nearer to the "equal" end of the equality-inequality
> > scale than the degree to which each member of group2 is equal
> > to each other member of group2."
> Ah, but that is not the meaning of your version! That could be the
> meaning of my second sentence, if it didn't somewhat contradict the
> first one, but it can't possibly be the meaning of your version,
> which compares the equality of X and Y to that of Y and X.

No, it's the meaning I only the other day realized was possible,
after I thought about your version.

> Suppose we change to a two-place predicate where it does make sense
> to say that one way exceeds the other way: X loves Y more than
> Y loves X. But how do you fit that to the orwellian pattern?
> "Everybody loves, but some love more than others". But that does not
> mean that "everybody loves each other, but some love others more than
> those others love them".

And the Orwell pattern means either "Everyone is of equal status
to each other but da someone can exceed someone else in status"
or "All groups of people exhibit egality, but some groups of people
exhibit egality to a greater extent than other groups of people do".
It doesn't mean "Everyone is equal to something, but some people
are equal to something more than some other people are", though I
suppose it could mean "Everyone is equal to someone else, but
some people are equal to someone else more than some other people
are".

> My point is that for the _second sentence_ to make sense, "equal"
> has to be taken as one-place, because "more" is comparing some
> people to others, and not a relationship going one way or the other
> way between a given pair of arguments.

I don't see why. "Some people are more reluctant than others" doesn't
turn reluctance into a one-place; it just leaves the second place
unspecified. I'm also not sure that the second sentence is supposed to
make sense; maybe it's supposed only to sound as though it made sense.

> > I maintain that "equality" must be suore place, but I accept that
> > it is possible to define new predicates, e.g. you could have one
> > place simklama meaning "x1 is a mass/set, one part/member of which
> > is le klama, another part of which is le se klama, another part of
> > which is le te klama,... etc.".
> I don't understand what is it that you want to maintain about "equality".
> (a) {dunli} is a suhore-place Lojban predicate.
                   ^^^^^^
Have I succeeded in subverting Lojban orthography at last then?

> (b) "equal" is never used as the English equivalent of a one-place
>     predicate.

(c) The concept "equality" is suzrelselsui.

> If you mean (a), then I agree, of course. If you mean (b), then
> I disagree. Reciprocal predicates are just as valid as any other
> predicate, and "equal" is used reciprocally in English. Sometimes
> "equal" will be translated as "dunli" and sometimes as "dunsi'u".

I'm talking not about the valency of the word _equal_, but about the
concept, the selvla.

> > I think the logical workings should be out in the open, clear for
> > all to see, reflected iconically in the syntax.
> Ok, but then I don't agree that your version of explicit logic
> reflects what Orwell's phrase says in English.

Well I did say I thought I might have misunderstood the original
English version.

> I think that a closer rendering might be:
>     ro prenu ro prenu cu jikydunli
>     i ku'i su'o prenu su'o prenu cu zmadu le ka [ke'a] jikydunli [da]
>     Every person is equal to every person.
>     But some person is more than some person in being equal
>     (to someone).
> But the problem with this is that it spoils the effect that the English
> version has. The effect in English is achieved by treating a reciprocal
> predicate, perfectly idiomatic in the first sentence, as if it was a
> normal one place property, which is what the second sentence requires.
> By decomposing the reciprocal predicate, the second sentence is no
> longer a natural rejoinder to the first. Unless you give a translation
> like yours, which is a natural rejoinder, but whose logic is different
> than the one in English. Maybe this is what you were saying all along,
> if so, sorry about all the nitpicking.

It's sufficiently close to what I was originally saying for me to
accept the apology and, with the utmost charity, grant forgiveness
for the nitpicking. Te absolvo.

---
And