Re: TECH: {loi} & {loe}

la .and. joi la xorxes. joi la pycyn. cusku be di'e casnu

> 1. Xorxe, pc & me agree that past discussion of "masses" [i.e.
> the meaning of {loi}/{lei}] has involved several distinguishable
> factors:

I grant that they are distinguishable, but are they necessarily to be
distinguished?  For that matter, I believe the distinction between "collective"
and "porridge" to be a mirror of the (hazy) English distinction between mass
nouns and count nouns (unfortunate in this context, but firmly fixed in
our terminology).

When the selbri of a "loi" represents an English mass noun, we speak of
"porridge", whereas when the selbri represents an English count noun, we speak
of "collective", it seems to me.  BTW, I take "Napoleon" and the like to be
mass nouns; I don't know if this is standard, but they fit the profile
otherwise.

> 2. Xorxe, pc & me agree that {loi}/{lei} (&, I presume, {joi} & other
> stuff labelled "mass") should be a COLLECTIVIZER.
> 
> pc:
> > The collective sense seems to be the one we get the most use out of,
> > so we should probably tie it to _loi_ and its analogs.
> 
> Xorxes to me:
> > > As for masses, I don't want to debate them all over again until there is
> > > an official refgrammar treatment of them. Until that exists, I will
> > > continue with what is my current belief - that we either don't know
> > > or disagree about what "masses" are.
> > I think I've already formed an idea of what they are: the collective
> > plural. If they are something else, then I would like to know how to
> > do the collective plural, which is something extremely necessary given
> >  that with le/lo you can only get the distributive one.

I grant that one of the functions of a mass is to represent the collective
plural (of count nouns, that is).  But what is the function of "loi" applied
to a mass noun?  Lojban selbri represent mass nouns under the cover of
"x1 is a quantity of ...".   Therefore, "lo djacu" represents one or
more water-quantities (of indeterminate but definite size); "loi djacu"
represents a collective plural of these water-quantities, which in fact is
a porridgification of water.

> 3. I think we remain uncertain as to whether the {pi} fractionators
> before {loi} will now make any sense. In my view they don't.
> 
> Xorxes:
> > There was and maybe still is disagreement as to the default quantifier
> > for {loi}. Is {loi broda} "all the broda there are, collectively", or
> > is it "some broda, collectively". I think that the second one is the
> > more useful and the more consistent with the other defaults. In any
> > case both can be explicited: {piro loi broda} and {pisu'o loi broda}.

It has always been true that "loi broda" means "a-portion-of(massification-of
(all-of(brodas)))", hence "some broda taken collectively" is one interpretation,
but not the only one.  "mi joi do" normally means "you and I (collectively)",
but given the right interpretive context might mean "my hand plus yours,
exclusive of the rest of our bodies".  This was the example at which
{la xorxes.} originally jibbed, as I recall.

> 5. The other two erstwhile now-rejected candidate meanings for {loi}
> have previously been labelled respectively Myopic Singularizer, which
> is pc's "species"/Mr. Rabbit, and Porridgifier, which is [I think] pc's
> "shiftingly bounded continuities" [which soulds like a cowanism],

Jeeg and Talen and Zipf and R forbid!  I would never coin a phrase like that,
at least not intentionally.

> i.e. true masses.
>   To understand these, we must be aware of the distinction between
> (i) multiply-instantiated/many-membered categories, such as the
> category of cats, and (ii) what can be seen either as individuals or
> as single-membered categories, e.g. Napoleon, London, (the mass of all)
> wine. Lojban is fine on (i), but not fine on (ii). I will try to make
> sense of the current situation.

This looks like count nouns and mass nouns again.

>   (a) All selbri must be defined so as to conform to (i).

Agreed.  We do not talk of "x1 is wine", but "x1 is a quantity of wine".
But with "x1 is Napoleon", {ko'e cu me la napoleon.}, we don't have a problem,
because we can take the one-membered (or however-many-membered, in cases
like "x1 is one of the Three Kings") in the categorical interpretation.

>   (b) By processes of myopic singularization and of porridgification,
>       (ii)-type meanings derive from (i)-type meanings.

Just so, at least with regard to porridgification.  I never understood
myopic singulars: when the mythical Trobriander says "Ah, Mr. Rabbit again",
I understand him to be saying "Ah, another outlier of Rabbit-Porridge
({loi ractu})."  Kind of like wandering the world and occasionally
spotting another outcrop of the Midgard Serpent.

>   (c) If a (ii)-type meaning can't be derived from a (i)-type, we
>       must use a cmene to refer to it.

Such as?

>   (d) Meanings that are naturally (ii)-type, but which we wish to be
>       denoted by a selbri, must be altered to give them a (i)-type
>       meaning.

Yes, except that Lojban (as I read it) denies that there are any "natural"
(ii)-type meanings: all that is the result of Whorfian Mind-Lock (TM).
The natural-to-Lojban mode allows for both individual and collective/porridge
reference, but makes the distinction uniformly across all selbri, without
calling some selbri "naturally mass" and others "naturally count".
(This rule is not always and everywhere satisfied: some selbri subcategorize
for masses.)

>  Porridgification involves taking a number of individuals and erasing
> their boundaries. Thus, e.g., a heap of cheeses can be seen as cheeses
> or as cheese. A load of cows can be seen as cows or as cattle.

Just so.  This is porridgification, but it is also collectivity.
Indeed, I would say that collectivity is a special case of porridgification.

>  Myopic singularization involves identifying every member of the
> category with every other member, i.e. failing to recognize the
> differences between them.

I don't see this as corresponding to mass behavior at all, vide supra.
Certainly it doesn't match my concept of a species (jutsi), which is an
individual, not a class or set or collective.  >Homo sapiens< is an individual,
ontologically on a par with other individuals; its components are various
(biological) individuals alive or dead.

> Jorge to pc:
> > I don't think Lojban makes the distinction between "shiftingly bounded
> > continuities" and its opposite, at least not with any article. If I
> > put {pa lo djacu} in a bucket, and then I put another {pa lo djacu} in
> > it, and then I show the result to you, you will hardly want to say that
> > the bucket contains {re lo djacu}. On the other hand, if I put {pa lo
> > mlatu} and then another {pa lo mlatu}, you will see {re lo mlatu} in
> > the bucket. If I cut a {pa lo djacu} in half, I end up with {re lo djacu}.
> > If I cut a {pa lo mlatu} in half, I do not end up with {re lo mlatu}.
> > This is because {djacu} is normally a shiftingly bounded continuity,
> > while {mlatu} is not, and the gadri don't change that property. So
> > {mlatu} and {djacu} behave differently under fission and fusion because
> > of their intrinsic semantics, not because of any external marker.

I agree with this 100%.

> I agree. But all the same, the definition of {djacu} must contain criteria
> for distinguishing between {pa djacu} and {re djacu}. I would propose
> that {pa djacu} is continuous and entirely surrounded by non-djacu. The
> important point is that there must be such criteria built into the
> definition of {djacu}.

Why so?  In particular cases, we may have criteria for distinguishing them.
But I have no trouble with saying that there are {recigeixa djacu} in this
bucket (1 mole, or 10 g if I remember the rules correctly).

> .. pc's loe cikagoan, which is the average chicagoan. So pc-wise,
> your examples mean "the average apple is wanted by
> me" and "the average cow-killing lion will be hunted by me".

Yes, except that "average" refers here to an abstraction, not the concrete
object which most nearly resembeles that abstraction (aka "the most typical
Yale man").

>  X is right that "he is a house builder" does not entail that
> there is a house he has built.

First of all, I have trouble with this statement if extended tenselessly.
I "He is a house builder" really compatible with "He never has and never
will build any house whatsoever?"

Second, note that tenseless Lojban bridi (unlike their English translations)
are potentially any of "caa", "ka'e", "nu'i", or "pu'e".  Is "He is a house
builder" really compatible with "There does not [tenselessly] exist any house
that he is capable of building?"

-- 
John Cowan					cowan@ccil.org
		e'osai ko sarji la lojban.