Re: Dvorak (& Lojban)

[bob@MEGALITH.RATTLESNAKE.COM]

   ... because the former implies that you don't have in mind a
   specific cat, which "lo" clearly dictates. ...

I know we have discussed this too much in the past, so I won't get into
this, except to note that you are expanding your universe of reference
more than is warranted.

I have a friend who has two cats and two tiny dogs.  When one cat and
one dog are in the room and she says {le mlatu} I have not the
foggiest idea to which animal she is referring.  But when she says {lo
mlatu}, I know she is referring to the specific cat that is in the
room.

This is because of the pragmatic way she handles context.  When she is
saying `that which I designate' the designated entity is likely to be
somewhat like a similar real entity, but not necessarily be the real
entity.  However, she hardly ever makes reference to objects outside
the current context without warning me first.  So, when she refers to
{that which is really a cat}, I don't expect her to be referring to
any real cat in the universe, but to the real cat in the context of
the conversation.  Of course, when she has expanded the context to
include the whole universe, then `real cat' is unspecified.  Under
these circumstances, you are quite right.  But these are not the
circumstances.

Many logicians always presume that the context is bigger than their
interlocutor expects.  I am not a logician, nor are most of the people
with whom I have conversations.

--

    Robert J. Chassell               bob@rattlesnake.com
    25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road     bob@ai.mit.edu
    Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA   (413) 298-4725