Re: knowledge and belief

[Mark Vines <vinesm@wholefoods.com>]

la xorxes. cusku di'e

> Yes, but to claim that someone else is convinced of
> something one need not consider it true, while to claim
> that someone else knows something one must. That's the
> difference that I have been pointing out, not the use
> in the first person.

la markl. spuda la xorxes. di'e

I perceive a split here between what I might describe as
logically minded people & what I might describe as more
pragmatically minded people.

A pragmatically minded person has no problem saying
something like, "I don't know what her name is, but Genaro
does; go ask him."

This is outrageous to the logically minded person.  "How
can you say that Genaro 'knows' her name when you haven't
even verified that what Genaro claims to 'know' is really
her name?"

The pragmatically minded person is typically either
amused, annoyed or both.  "Why waste time asking me how
I can say what I said?  If you want to learn her name,
go ask Genaro!"

The logically minded person can cite the definition of
Lojban {djuno} - or English "know" - until the cows come
home, & the pragmatically minded person won't care, altho
s/he may pretend to care for the sake of politeness.  To
the pragmatically minded person, what matters is not how
the word is defined but, rather, what the speaker or
author meant when using it.  The definition usually helps
in identifying the speaker's or author's meaning:  but
not always.  Sometimes the definition is just an obstacle
that gets in the way of the sympathetic reading or
listening that is required for pragmatic understanding.

The pragmatically minded person can refine the definition
with alternative glosses, trying to bring it closer to
hi/r intuitions about how authors & speakers really use
the word in practice, & the logically minded person won't
care, altho s/he may pretend to care for the sake of
politeness.  To the logically minded person, the value of
a statement largely depends on how well it adheres to the
prescriptive rigor demanded in logic.  Pragmatic usages
may produce rigorous statements:  but not always.
Sometimes pragmatic usages depart from the prescribed
definitions so dramatically that they're just an obstacle
that gets in the way of the semiotic concentration that
is required for logical evaluation.

I could propose a compromise:  to claim that someone else
is convinced of something, one need not consider it to be
true; to claim that someone else knows something, one must
consider its truth to be extremely likely, or at least
overwhelmingly plausible.  But such compromises are, by
their very nature, acceptable only to the pragmatically
minded people who do not need them.  Such compromises
might offer some illumination to the logically minded
people, but those are the very people who cannot allow
themselves to compromise.