Re: Knowledge and belief

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

>>My point was that {djuno ko'a fo ko'e} presupposes {ko'a jetnu ko'e}.
>
 >This works ONLY if truth is observer independent, which may not be the
case
>for some epistemologies.  ko'a jetnu ko'e has no observer place, so that
>it is only a true proposition if all who tested the truth using that
>epistemology would arrive at the same truth value.  Since such a test is
>not plausible for the kind of epistemologies that would cause problems, we
>would not use "jetnu" for those kinds of truths.  djuno on the other hand
>can be used for both objective truths and subjective ones, provided that
the
>subjectivity is on the part of le djuno.

So you say, but that doesn't work for "know". You would not make
a claim like: "John knows by personal revelation from God that I have
three children", would you? But if you replace "knows" with "is
absolutely convinced" then the claim is acceptable. But you seem
to be saying that you would make this claim: {la djan djuno le du'u
mi rirni cida kei fo le nu le djedi cu cusku ra ru} . Thus, you're saying
that {djuno} is not faithfully translatable by "know" in some cases.

 >   The statement "At time X, Y" should be true at all times
>that it is uttered, regardless of whether Y is true at the time that the
>above statement is uttered, provided that Y is indeed true at time X.  Once
>the time is fixed, then the truth value of Y is also fixed FOR THAT TIME.

Yes, I think we agree here. But you do accept that we can make
mistakes about the truth value of some statement, don't you?
If we now think that X is true, we will say "X is true" and honestly
believe that X is true. And we might also say "John knows that X",
and honestly believe it. Then we realize that we made a mistake,
X is not really true. It is not the truth value that changed. It is our
perception of it. So we now say, we were wrong, X is not true
after all. And of course, we don't keep saying "John knew that X",
we now say "John thought that X".

 >Now if Y is a proposition based on djuno, then the above statement says
that
>someone knows the x2 of Y at time X.  If indeed that someone knows that x2
at
> time X, then the fact that this x2 is found to be false should not change
>the truth valiue of the X-time knowledge claim.

No, it doesn't change its truth value. The truth value was false all along.
It's just that before we were under the mistaken impression that
it was true, and now we realized that it is true.

co'o mi'e xorxes