Re: Knowledge and Belief

[Rob Zook <rzook@INFORMIX.COM>]

At 04:32 PM 1/21/98 -0500, John Cowan wrote:
>Engdahl, Rod wrote:
>
>> On the other hand, when we say:
>>
>> "I (x1) know that <the Earth is the center> (x2) <of the solar
>> system>(x3) according to <Ptolemaic theory> (x4)."
>>
>> that is a true statement.  Once we give a context of a (even internally
>> consistent) model, direct correspondence with reality is not necessarily
>> required.
>
>Quite.  *Sometimes* when we repudiate earlier truth claims, we have
>acquired a new theory/epistemology/metaphysics/model/whatever.

If I say mi djuno <Y>, then the unspecified x4 place would almost
always be my current world view, or portion thereof applied to the
current context.


>That is fine, because then we are saying:
>
>        x1 knows x2 by model S, and not-x2 is true by model T.
>
>which is no contradiction.  *Most* of the time, though, when
>we repudiate an earlier truth claim, we have *not* changed our
>model, but simply adjusted our belief structure, and then
>we say:
>
>        If not-x2 is true by model S, then x1 not-knows x2 by model S.

What difference do you see between model and belief structure in
the context you just used?


Rob Z.
--------------------------------------------------------
Were it offered to my choice, I should have no objection
to a repetition of the same life from its beginning, only
asking the advantages authors have in a second edition to
correct some faults in the first.
-- Ben Franklin