Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

John:
> > If not, then within
> > that system it was true and justified, and thus knowledge. The
> > system you persist in regarding the situation should be regarded
> > as seperated and more inclusive from the one Sam and Frank evaluated
> > it from.
>
> The point is that when they arrived on Bermuda, the justified false
> belief had become a justified true one, but they hadn't *learned*
> anything.  Therefore, their justified true belief on 12 November
> doesn't count as *knowledge*.

I would say that on a belknappian fuzzy scale of knowledgeness, it
nonetheless scores fairly highly, but I am willing to concede that
on an anti-belknappian absolute 2-valued scale, it is 0 rather
than 1.

> la .and. cusku di'e
>
> > >I don't know whether I agree or not. Either way, this point is
> > >a refinement of my more general point, which is that DJUNO means
> > >"know" AND has a metaphysics place.
>
> So it is.
>
> > >We can then go on to discuss what *precisely* counts as knowledge,
> > >but it ceases to be a Lojban-specific issue (except to the extent
> > >that DJUNO involves knowledge).
>
> If "djuno" doesn't involve knowledge, then what does it involve?

It does involve knowledge. But the important thing is that we
have agreed that it involves the thing that English word "knowledge"
denotes. Likewise we are agreed that "gerku" = "dog" and "xekri"
= "black". Going on to debate the nature of knowledge, dogginess
and black is interesting, but in itself not essential for Lojban.

> I haven't even introduced, he said with a malicious grin, Nozick's
> four-point definition of knowledge, viz:
>
>         A knows p iff:
>                 1) A believes p;
>                 2) p is true;
>                 3) if p were false, then A wouldn't believe it;
>                 4) if p were true, then A would believe it.

That's very helpful.
It should be noted that the statement can't be interpreted with
purely logical "if"s. There is also implicit quantification over
possible worlds. In that case, (3) makes sense.
(4) interpreted with logical "if" is vacuous. Interpreted with
conditional "if", I don't think it's sufficient in itself; it
must at least be understood as "In all possible worlds in which
p is true and A entertains p, A believes p".
Maybe 3-4 could be combined as "In all possible worlds,
p is true and A entertains p iff A believes p".

--And