Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>I think that this example says more about the use of the word "truth"
>than the word "know": in the absence of  specifically contradictory
information
>we presume that "truth" is a universal truth in English, whereas there are
>(rather more rare) meanings of English "truth" that allow for relative
truth.

Right, so {fatci} is actually a quite useful word then, corresponding to
the more common meaning of the English word "true".

>The USAn Dewclaration of Independence"  We hold these truths to be
self-evident
>that all men are created equal, and that each is endowed with certain
>inalienable rights, and that among these rights are life, liberty and the
>pursuit of happiness."
>
>Now clearly there are some societies and cultures tthat do not recognize
>those statements as "true", so are they "truths"?  Can it be said that
>USAns don't really "know" these to be true, but merely "opine" them or
>"believe" them simply be4cause someone else choses NOT to accept
>them as truth?

Those who do not recognize them as truths will not say that USAns "know"
them, that's right. They will not call them truths either. They obviously
will
disagree that they are self evident truths. What's the problem?

>What ends up happening is that, in English at least, some schools of
>thought come to believe that nothing is "knowable" unless it is
"objectively"
>verifiable" - subjectigve truths like those I mention inherently cannot be
>"known".  Others, who do not place suich a hig vlaue on objective reality
as
>being superior to subjective reality, would claim that as nonsense, and
>assert that subjective truths can be know fully as much as objective ones.
>Indeed they wouyld say, "objective reality" is a myth because our
definitions
>of what is objective are themselves subjective.

Right, those are different schools of thought.

>When you start arguing in this way, you not only get to the point that
>there are no fatci (facts-in-the-absolute) but that there are no truths
>and there is no knowledge that is unioversally accepted as such.

I'm not arguing in this way. I'm just considering the everyday meanings
of "truth" and "knows", not the more abstruse meanings sometimes
posited by philosophers.

>The statement "la djan djuno X" must have the same truth value regardless
of
>what speaker says it, provided that the referents of the two sumti remain
>cvonstant.  This is not true for English "know" as you have argued.

What? I've never argued such a thing. As long as the speakers share the
same world view the statement will have the same truth value. It doesn't
make much sense to talk about truth values if the speakers don't share
the world view, because in that case they're speaking different languages,
as it were. What do you mean by "the same truth value"? Do you mean
in the absolute, independent of their world view? No matter how convinced
the USAn is, if  they tell me:  "I know that it is self evident that all men
are
created equal", then I will disagree and say that to me it is not self
evident.

co'o mi'e xorxes