Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>>BUT, if I am accurately reporting, then it may be
>>red according to my metaphysics even if it is blue according to yours.
>
>Maybe. I'm not sure what you mean. I don't see how this relates
>to our discussion either. If you say that something is red, but what
>you undersand as "red" is different from what I understand, what
>--More--
>are you communicating? You'd be just making some noise as far
>as I could tell.

If you presume that I am trying to communicate, then if I claim that you are
red, and you believe you are not red, then you might ask an appropriate BAI
question (by what standard?).  That you can ask such a question implies that
some communication has taken place, and more is possible with clairifcation.

>That's up to you of course. I suppose you don't have an answer then
>for what is it that makes some sentences  change meaning so
>drastically when you replace "is convinced" with "knows". Other than
>presupposition of truth.

I attribute it NOT to presuppostion of truth, but presupposition that truth
is objective.  We use "convinced" for subjective areas, and "know" for
objective areas" in English for contrast, and when you put the two in
juxtaposition, this suggests such a contrast, and therefore the
"convincing" proposition is seen as weaker than the "known" one.  When
not place in contrast, the two words are more likely to be used
interchangeably.

>>The gismu list says truth "in the absolute".
>
>Right. But "absolute" is a word like any other word. It needs a metaphysics
>under which to operate, just like {mlatu}, {blanu}, {klama}, etc. (list of
>all
>gismu here).

No, which is why fatci is useless.  It was added to specifically contrast
with jetnu, andthe phrase "in the absolute" was specifically chosen to DENY
the relevancy of metaphysics, on those rare occasions when philsophers
want to argue about the possibility of such absolutes.

>That is indeed most extreme.
>>General semanticists that deny the mathematical axiom of identity will not
>--More--
>>necessarily agree that "x=x" is a fatci (There is a guy who has been an
>>active Lojbanist at one time who is such a G.S. afifcionado - I am not
>saying
>>that all G.S. people are so extreme).
>
>Well, it's their prerogative to disagree, of course.
>
>[BTW, I notice that you are even using the word {fatci} in your English
>discourse. Surely it can't be so useless if you find it of use even when
>speaking a language other than Lojban!]

Huh, I was using it as an example to show that "'x=x' cu fatci" is not
valid because there are metaphysical principles that deny it.
>I think you missed my point. I am not talking of the claim {la lojbab cu
>rirni re da }. I am talking of the full claim {le du'u la lojbab cu rirni re
>da
>cu fatci}. You seem to be saying that that last claim has to be false
>no matter what. "In the absolute."

In my opinion (%^), every claim of fatci is false because of the necessity
of "inthe absolute".  That is part of the history of th inclusion of the word
fatci in the language.  Thatthis history is not recorded in the gismu list may
mean that it gets forgotten, bbut I will do my best to see it not forgotten.

>You seem to be under the misimpression that the presupposition of truth
>of the x2 of djuno is somehow a hidden assumption. It is not. It is as overt
>as it can be.

It is hidden in the sense that
la djan cu djuno da
seems to change in truth vakue according to your definition based on
who says it.  If George is willing to presuppose that da jetnu
then the statement is true, but if Jeff is not than the statement is not
true.  Yet neither George or Jeff are explicit places in the sentence, and
one has no idea who the speaker is when one sees the bare statement on a
piece of paper.

A presumption requires a presumer, and whose presumption matters- the
speaker's, the listener's, or le djuno.  I contend that only le djuno's
presumption can be relevant since the speaker is not always knowlable, and
likewise the lset of listeners, and it seems unacceptable that truth of
a proposition be NECESSARILY based in such a way.  Indeed, what seems to
be the case is that the truth of
la djan cu djuno da
(leka jetnu) has become based on something not in the place structure of
jetnu, in particular the speaker or listener or whoever you feel needs to
be the presumer of les se djuno in order for
le du'u la djan cu djuno da cu jetnu
to be valid.

lojbab