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Re: more epistemic perversity
Lojbab:
>Now if George says "I know X", how does John report this. he can say that
>"George says that he knows X".
Right.
> But if knowledge is an internal state not judgeable by others, then
> "george says that he knows X, but he doesn't" means that
> we are accusing George of lying about his internal state.
We wouldn't say "but he doesn't" because "George doesn't
know X" still has the presupposition that X is true. What we
might say is "but he is wrong", meaning that we accept that he
honestly believes X to be true, but X happens to not be true.
>If George is
>presumed to be telling the truth about his internal state then
>John should be able to report this fact as "George knows X".
Not if X is not true and John knows it.
>But as I understand it, you would have John's opinion/presumption/knowledge
>somehow enter into the definition of djuno,
Not in the definition. It enters in how John uses {djuno}, yes.
>without any justification based on theplace structure - so that John
>could not say "George knows X" unless John
>also can say "I know X" or at least "I assume X"
Right.
>You have cited various wording choices as the basis for your belief about
the
>meaning of djuno, but those choices were made for other reasons. For
example
>the word "fact" used to describe x2 has nothing to do with fatci, but is a
>codeword for "you need to put a du'u abstraction in here". I would not use
>"proposition" which you might consider the logically correct term for a
du'u
>because it is longer, and most people don't know what it means anyway - but
>they accept that fact can include factoids and other data that are still
>disputable in English.
You used (du'u) in most other places that require a {du'u} clause.
But this point is not very relevant, I agree. I don't think my argument
hinges on that.
> You have also largely based your case on arguments
>asosciated with objective facts - things that indeed most people can agree
are
>true such as numbers of children and dates of armistices.
Those are the clearest examples to show that "knows" has
presupposition of truth. If it didn't, there would be no reason
for it to fail where "is convinced" works well.
>BUt people use the word "know" for other things that are not OBJECTIVELY
>knowable.
Of course they do. Just as people use the word "true" for many things
that are not OBJECTIVELY knowable.
>Whether there is a God, where someone loves someone else.
No problem with that. If you believe that there is a God, then you
might say:
la djan djuno le du'u la cev cu zasti
John knows that God exists.
la djak naldjuno le du'u la cev cu zasti
Jack doesn't know that God exists.
But if you believe that God does not exist, then you would not
say either of those, because both presuppose the existence of God.
>These are things that we say we "know", and they are things that we
sometimes
>say that other people "know", though I agree that we are more likely to
couch
>the statement in terms of "believe" if indeed we ourselves do not share the
>presumption of truth.
Not just more likely. If you couch them in terms of "know" your audience
will understand that you are commited to the belief yourself.
>>But those people don't call that "knowledge" opinions! They don't
>>say: "I think that it will rain, therefore I know that it will rain by my
>>opinion".
>
>But they might say "I know it will rain." without anyy qualification.
Yes.
>And if you ask them how they know, they will answer you.
Yes.
>The English word "know" does not require or imply a "by X", but
>djuno does. But people use the English word know as if it had
>such a requirement, because they will be able
>to accept the question "how?" as meaningful, I think in all cases.
Yes.
> This is not the case for "believe" or "be certain", where "how?"
>or "why?" are not always meaningful.
It seems to be meaningful for "be certain".
"How can you be so sure?" seems seems pretty natural.
>I can say
>mi djuno le du'u so da cu plini le solri
>and provided that no new planets are discovered during my life, this will
be
>true throughout my life after 4th grade when I first learned this factoid.
Right. (But notice that "this will be true throughout my life" presupposes
that truths have a temporal extension, which kind of defeats what you're
trying to argue for.)
>I think it is reasonably safe to say that most others consider the same
>to be true (barring recent discoveries that may indicate planet-like
>objects beyond Pluto). So most people would say
>la lojbab djuno le du'u so da cu plini le solri
Right.
>After I die, people will be able to report this as
>la lojbab pu djuno le du'u so da cu plini le solri
Right.
>But you are claiming that if by some chance after I die that a tenth
>planet is discovered, that
>la lojbab pu djuno le du'u so da cu plini le solri
>
>somehow becomes false
It doesn't "become" false. We discover that it is false.
We discover that you and everybody else were mistaken.
It happens all the time.
>You would apparently have to relegate my former knowledge to krici, or
jinvi,
>or birti or something else, even though no one while I was alive would say
>that this was necessary.
Right.
>I submit that the meaning of
>la lojbab pu djuno le du'u so da cu plini le solri
>
>should not change depending on externalities such as what some people
>may possibly find out at some future time.
Of course the meaning didn't change! Our perception of the
world changed, so that the meaning no longer matches our
perception.
>It is a report on what my
>internal state was at the time implied by pu, including the epistemology
>on which I based that state.
Right. In English we would then say: "Lojbab thought that there were
nine planets orbiting the sun". In Lojban: {la lojbab pu jinvi le du'u
so da cu plini le solri}.
co'o mi'e xorxes