Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

>>But the beliefs of the speaker do NOT enter into the evaluation of truth
>>of the proposition. The beliefs of the speaker may be relevant to judge
>>the honesty of the assertion, but not its truth.
>
>You seem to be contradictiong your earlier statements, which I remember as
>being that the presumption of the speaker is critical to the truth of a
>djuno statement.

No, you are misremembering. The truth of the x2 is critical to the truth
of the djuno statement. The speaker of the djuno statement presupposes
the x2 to be true. This presupposition does not make it true.

>NOW it seems that you are saying that the critical factor is some absolute
>truth of the proposition, independent of speaker, listener, and presumed
>knower.

It has to be true by whatever standard of truth we are evaluating the
djuno claim or any other claim, it need be no more nor less absolute
or objective than that.

>>(1) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter knows that she does.
>>(2) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter is convinced that she does.
>>
>>Why is (1) still odd and (2) still ok?
>
>tackling this, it seesm that the English works the way it does because the
>knowledge/convincing clause is subordinate to a statement of (presumed)
truth.

What do you mean the knowledge/convincing clause? In one case
it works and in the other it doesn't. Why?

>Peter knows that Alice loves John, but she doesn't (really) sounds odd
>but is plausible as a suggestion that they hold different definitions of
>love.

Ok, then you're saying that "Alice loves John" is true by one definition
of love and "she doesn't" is true by another definition. The only way you
can make sense of it is by making them both true, which supports
the presupposition of truth.

>I will agree that your examples show flaws with "is convinced" in that it
is
>ambiguous between the definitions I intended for birti and djuno.  We seem
>to normally take "is convinced" to mean some kind of dogged certainty that
>may exist despite the facts, which is what I think birti means.  Whereas
>I meant by
>"is convinced" that sense associated with "justified", where the
jsutification
>is an epistemology rather than necessarily some tangible or arguable
evidence.

It's funny that you now talk of  "the facts" as though you believe that they
exist. But again, someone can be justifiedly convinced of something that
is not true. For example, let's say George has a twin brother but John
doesn't
know it. John sees George's twin brother in Paris and he justifiedly
believes
him to be George. So we can say:

        George is not in Paris, but John is convinced that he is
        (because he saw George's twin brother there).

But we cannot say:

        George is not in Paris, but John knows that he is
        (because he saw George's twin brother there).

because we know better. On the other hand, John could very well
say:

        I know that George is in Paris because I saw him there.

He thinks that he knows, he really believes that George is there,
so he is not lying, and he is justified in his use of "know". But he is
mistaken, and the sentence is simply not true.

co'o mi'e xorxes