Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>> >Lojbab has no response to 2.1.
>>
>> No, I have a different paradigm in mind, and I see the differences implicit
>> in krici/jinvi/djuno, including in their place structures, to render this
>> particular contrast invalid.
>
>Could you (re-)spell this out more clearly?

I ahve done so in a recent message respoding to Jorge, but you may be missing
much list traffic - AC.UK has been sending bounce messages like crazy the last
few days.  The contarst I was referring to was working from krici to birti
to djuno.

>Asserting "John knows X" DOES assert only that John knows X. However,
>for all speakers of English with the implausibly self-proclaimed exception
>of you, the relationship "know" denoted by the word _know_ is such
>that John cannot know X if X is false. It therefore follows
>inescapably that asserting only that John knows X includes an
>assertion that X is true.
>
>This is said for the 100th time. I simply cannot comprehend that you
>still don't see what I and others are saying.

true under what metaphysics (and to whom if that is relevant).  If John is
using a metaphysics that i accept and you do not (and presumably he accepts
it), you would seem to be saying that, to me, John knows X, and to you
John cannot know X.  But djuno does not include a metaphysics place so we
have no way of knowing other than by implication from the epistemology.
But as to John's knowing, who decides?  I was thinking that Jorge was arguing
that the speaker decides based on his presumption of truth, but am not sure
that Jorge still feels this way based on recent responses.  Other areas of
Lojban pragmatic prescription have tried to make the onus on the speaker
to make things plain to the listener, which would suggest that the
speaker must defer to the listener's metaphysics if known.

The bottom line is that we need to agree as to what it means for John to
djuno le du'u la jegvo cu broda
where broda is any number of religious assertions that a religious person
would assert that they "know" and not merely "believe", but which an atheist
would assert that they cannot "know".  But can they djuno by x4 their religion
(I note int passing that there are people who would claim to know
certain religious beliefs because they practice their religion, but in
fact do not really "believe", certainly not in the krici sense of pure
faith.  For them the religious beliefs are "true" so they can "know" them,
but when they subject their beliefs to rational analysis, all of a sudden
they don't believe - they are using a different epistemology.)

The bottom line is that I recognize that "truth" is not universally agreed
upon, and I want a definition of "djuno" that people can understand without
necessarily agreeing on whether le se djuno is true.  If le djuno presumes
it is true (when using the stated epistemology) that should be sufficient,
even if I as speaker or listener do not so presume.

>Even if you had your way and {djuno} were defined as you would wish,
>the definition that others are adovcating for {djuno} could be
>assigned to some other brivla with exactly the same place structure.
>Remember that.

No - they need a metaphysics place tied to the x2 instead of or in addition to
the x4 place that you have agreed is tied mnore strongly to x1 (recognizing
that some epistemologies imply certain metaphysics and vice versa).

>> krici and jinvi do not have epistemology places,
>
>This may be so. What do you think the difference is between jinvi's
>x4, the "grounds" for the opinion, and djuno's x4, the "epistemology"
>--More--
>for the opinion?

Well first of all, le jinvi can hold an opinion without "knowing" that it is
true by any epistemology.  It is my opinion that Saddam Hussein should be
removed from power.  I can justify this opinion, but I can recognize that
there are counterarguments EVEN UNDER MY EPISTEMOLOGY, but the weight of
argument to me leads to the conclusion.  In general, we use "thinks" and
"opines" for propositions that we recognize are arguable - that others
do not accept as true.

A certain person haas argued on misc.education
that taxes for public education are "coercion at the point of a gun
" to support something he doesn't believe in.  He bases this on certain
assumptions that I associate with libertarianism, coupled with the
penalty for tax evasion being imprisonment (which might require that one
be arrested by a policeman who typically carries a firearm).  Now I can see,
given his odd collection of assumptions, how he reaches his conclusion.


I would call this lo se jinvi.  I would not call it lo se krici.  I am not
sure that I would call it lo se djuno be ko'a - he is quite unclear in
 distinguishing his argued opinions from the "facts" he uses to justify them.
 He
probably is not of an open mind about the truth of his statements so HE probably
consides that he knows/djuno this as "truth".

In contrast, I clearly jinvi that he is wrong.  I would not claim to djuno
that he is wrong - our differences are based on differences in definitions of
words and assumptions, and how we prioritze evidence.

On the other hand, because I am certain (emotionally) that his assumpotions
and definitions are non-standard, I could also say that mi birti that he is
wrong.

Do these examples help?

lojbab