Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >1. Why are three distinct notions conflated into the x2 of jetnu?
> >They should have been separated out. As it stands, if "ko`a jetnu
> >ko`e", you don't know whether ko`e is a metaphysics, a standard, or
> >an epistemology. Okay, that works, but it seems a bit weird to have a
> >common or garden *gismu*, rather than an abstruse philosopher's
> >jargon lujvo, meaning "x2 is either a metaphysics, a standard or an
> >epistemology for the truth of x1"!
>
> 1) because I was unclear on the terminology when I wrote the place
> structure
>
> 2) because I was sloppy on the terminology when I wrote the place
> structure
>
> 3) because using a standard or epistemology in that position may or may not
> implicitly indicate a metaphysics.

But is this actually defining for {jetnu}, or is it like your use of
"know" in the definition for {djuno} - nondefining, and misleading
due to your pardonable and relative lack of competence when writing
the documentation?

> >2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu}
> >not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na
> >birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place.
>
> I am presuming that whatever goes into that x2 (wihtout compromising
> terminology by further misusing it) is that which resolves the truth of x1
> given the acknolwedgement that truth is or can be subjective.  Recent
> discussion leads me to believe that the term for this is "metaphysics"
> and not "epistemology" with the difference being shown by djuno - that a
> metaphysics would be tied to the x2 whereas an epistemology is tied to x1.
>
> If I am now correctly understanding, then the use of a standard or an
> epsitemology in the x2 would be a metonymy or metaphor for a metaphysics.
> Since we have no clear idea how to state standards, epistemologies, and
> metaphysics's as  sumti, I am not sure how we would tell the difference in
> any event.  Although I would presume that "tu'a mi
> in the x2 would indicate that thespeaker is acknowledging that the standard
> of truth or perhaps the metaphysics being relied upon is perhaps subjective
> and limited only to the speaker.

But how about an answer to my question, which has also independently
been posed by Jorge a number of times?

> >> In "la djan. djuno X" there is no need to resolve "mi", nor to know who
> >> the speaker is, to understand the claim.  Therefore the truth-belief of
> >> the speaker should be irrelevant to the truth of "la djan djuno X".
> >
> >I agree. I have been saying this all along. Indeed, it's exactly what
> >I say in the quoted stuff you were replying to.
> >
> >It is only you who somehow thinks that the true-x2 version of djuno
> >somehow peculiarily requires a place for the speaker.
>
> Somewhere in the discussion, this idea crept through to me as being what you
> guys were arguing about.  I now have heard from both you and Jorge that this
> is NOT what you were taking issue with.
>
> On the other hand, what you are apparently taking issue with is the
> necessaity for x2 to be true (you and Jorge are claiming that it has to be
> while I am claiming that because truth can be subjective, that only le
> djuno can decide the basis for determining the truth of x2).

This is better than your previous understanding, but still not quite
right.

I am arguing that if {djuno} is to be usefully distinct from other
{gismu}, then, in the current absence of alternative distinctions [an
absence which I hope to rectify in a later message], a useful
distinction is for x2 of {djuno} to be true.
I am NOT arguing that {djuno} MUST be defined in such a way that its
x2 is true. Just that, other things being equal, {djuno} SHOULD be so
defined.

You, though, seem to be arguing that the true-x2 version of {djuno}
is somehow inherently flawed, and I strongly contest that. If you did
turn out to be correct then your argument would pertain not to
{djuno} in particular but to the entire vocabulary.

> In English, I will admit that we would not normally say "John knows X"
> unless we ourselves consider X to be true (the earlier statement of this
> may be how I got the idea that the non-x1 speaker was relevant to the truth
> standard).  But if we acknolwedge the possibility that John may be using
> a metaphysics different than one we would choose, and perhaps even one that
> we cannot choose, then djuno would be useful for reporting John's
> perception of reality without committing with regard to our own.

OK. So the next step is to distinguish this satisfactorily from {birti} and
{jinvi} [cf. e.g. a future message from me], and I at least am content to go
along with you.

> I no longer think that the true-x2 version requires a place for the speaker,
> but it does require a place, corresponding to jetnu, that ties to the
> x2 as the epistemology ties to the x1.  I think that Cowan wrote indicating
> understanding and agreement with this within the last couple of days,
> and saying that djuno should then have had such an x5, but it doesn't.

I think I missed those messages.

At any rate, as I've said elsewhere, I don't see why x2's being true
requires a metaphysics place while x2's being, say, feline doesn't.

So, to repeat, I deny that there is anything intrinsically
problematic with the true-x2 version of {djuno}.

> >So what we disagree on is on whether
> >
> >    ko`a jetyju`o ko`e   [where jetyju`o = true-x2 version of djuno]
> >
> >has a truth-value that is as independent of the speaker as {ta
> >mlatu}.
>
> I certainly have no problem with there being a jetyju'o limited only to
> x2 beuing true.  I also agree that in most cases, djuno would suffice

Good. So if it works for {jetyju`o} then it could work for {djuno}.

> >> But I also realize that in such media, the speaker cannot know who his
 reade
> >> will be, and it makes a lot better sense for the standard of djuno to be
> >> le djuno.
> >
> >What "standard of djuno" do you mean?
>
> The choice of x4 and the choice of metaphysics by which x2 is to be judged
> unless they are explicitly stated.  Now the x4 is called out in the place
> structure, and hence can easily be used and specified, thereby restrciting the
> knowledge claim.  As baselined, djuno has no way for a speaker to specify
> any metaphysical basis as being distinct from that which le djuno might
> choose.

{djuno} doesn't even specify the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2
to be true.

Anyway, I would be content to define the true-x2 version of {djuno} as "...
and x2 is true by the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2 to
be true". That would side-step the problem you raise.

> I think thatthe usefulness of all this comes out in the possibility of a
> lujvo jifydjuno (false-knowledge) which would be used for example to
> talk about things that the ancient Greeks "knew" (i.e. they would have
> reported it legitimately as "mi djuno" using typical epistemologies for the
> time), but which later learning has proven false because our view of
> reality has changed.

Right.

> If one can have false-knowledge, then one can also talk about true-knowledge,
> those truths held by the ancient Greeks that we still recognize today.

Right.

> But I worry about the *necessity* of lo se jifydjuno, for which the ancient
> Greeks used djuno, being false today even with all places specified,
> including a tense - ca le dzexelso that was true then, merely because our
> concept of reality has changed, WITHOUT being forced to recognize that
> two different realities are involved.

Can't quite follow you here, but I don't think it;s crucial.

> I don't think (jinvi) that this applies to "ta mlatu" on its own
> provided that mlatu has not changed meaning.

Ditto.

> >OK. So if there are multiple realities each accessible only by a
> >different observer, and the observer actually cognizes the reality,
> >then what you'd need is
> >
> >   x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3 by observer-dependent metaphysics x5
> >with
> >      epistemology x4
> >
> >You might then define {djuno} as:
> >
> >   x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent
> >      metaphysics, with epistemology x4
> >
> >Now my question would be this: if x1 is in error - if x1 thinks that
> >x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent metaphysics, with
> >epistemology x4, but x1 is in fact mistaken and x2 is, by the
> >metaphysics, not true, *would this count as djuno*?
>
> Going back to this, I think that djuno requires a metaphysics by which x1
> could conclude that x2 is true.

Could *correctly* conclude that x2 is true?

I think you will want to answer No. To this, and also to my original
question.

> Since the metaphysics is not stated or
> even statable in the place structure, then it would not count as djuno
> only if there existed NO metaphysics consistent with the other elements.
> But we are now in the epicycles within epicycles, and I am not sure that
> I can conceive of an x1-dependent metaphysics that would generate truths
> that x1 would consider false (or flasehoods that x1 would consider true).

If you can't conceive of these then it won't serve as a test-case.

Anyway, I can work out what I think your answers should be according
to your views stated elsewhere.

--And.