Re: Truth-ambiguous djuno [was Re: Summary so far on DJUNO]

["Erik W. Cornilsen" <thanatos@DIMENSIONAL.COM>]

From: Jorge J. Llamb=EDas <jorge@intermedia.com.ar>

>la erik cusku di'e
>> With truth being a much stickier subject than knowledge,
>>removing any trace of it from "djuno" allows one to speak of knowledge
>>without being bogged-down by truth.
>
>In what sense is truth stickier than knowledge? It would seem
>they are both bogging us down to the same extent.

In the sense that we can say that we can have an epistemology by which
we derive knowledge, but who can say if that epistemology would be in
complete accordance with the Real World?

>>If the x1 believed but the speaker did not, this would indicate that
>>they were not using the same epistemology.
>
>Not necessarily. The speaker might consider that x1 is not using
>the epistemology correctly. For example, let's say that John believes
>that the derivative of f(x)=3Dln(x) is g(x)=3Dxln(x)-x by the epistemolo=
gy
of
>mathematics. Now, if the speaker knows that g(x) is not the derivative
>of f(x), that does not indicate that they are not using the same
>epistemology, it only indicates that the speaker knows that John
>is mistaken in his belief.

I was assuming that x1 could correctly claim "mi djuno ... ," which in
that situation is not true.  The truth of the entire djuno bridi is in
question then, not the truth of the x2.  "You don't know that by that
epistemology because that epistemology doesn't produce that statement"
is different than "You don't know that because it's not true."  The
believed truth of x2 independent of x4 is not at issue.

>
>>Perhaps the x1 was using an
>>epistemology the speaker considered to be flawed, i.e., not producing
>>true statements, for the particular subject, and the speaker could not
>>use djuno.
>
>That's a possibility, but it's not necessary.


>
>>Having recognized that the x1 is using an epistemology which x1
believes
>>to be producing true results, but which is actually in error, the
>>speaker must then doubt their own epistemology by which they judged
the
>>x2 to be false.
>
>Why? Everybody can doubt their epistemologies, of course, but what
>you say doesn't follow at all.

So I tend toward Universal skepticism. :)  Having observed an instance
of a person believing that a flawed epistemology was not flawed, one
might question why they should believe themselves infallible in their
own beliefs.  Why should the speaker be immune to incorrect beliefs?

>>It is directly observed that not all epistemologies
>>which are believed to be producing true results by their users
actually
>>do produce true results.
>
>Right. That does not mean that no epistemology is valid.

But by what means do you determine which epistemologies are valid?

>>The speaker now can neither unreservedly agree nor disagree with the
x1
>>on the truthfulness of x2, unless to claim that their own personal
>>epistemology is infallible on the subject.
>
>Why? You don't have to believe your epistemology infallible in order
>to believe that something is true.

But there you've seperated your belief of truth from use of the
epistemology a bit.  Having acknowledged that your epistemology may be
fallible, you are left to believe in the truth of its statements
independently.  One could believe some subset of the statements
generated by an epistemology and not others, and still cover this with a
truth-ambiguous djuno.

>>Furthermore, the speaker can now not claim that anything they djuno is
>>absolutely true either, having recognized the fallibility of
>>epistemologies other than omniscience, and cannot use "mi djuno"
either.
>
>And yet speakers do use it all the time. Speakers say "such and such
>is true" all the time too.

Which is falsifiable based on the truth of the statement.  Assuming that
the epistemology is applied correctly even if it is invalid, "I
(truth-ambigous) know <statement> of <subject> by <epistemology> and I
believe <statement> to be true" is not falsifiable, while "I
(truth-ambigous) know <statement> ... and <statement> is true" is
falsifiable based on the truth of the <statement>.  Us skeptics could
use a truth-ambiguous djuno without any reservations, and without making
an assertion on the truth of the statement.  Also, determining the truth
of the djuno bridi is much more straight-forward, and it doesn't
retroactively vary in truth.

>>Thus, supposing that both the speaker and the x1 agree to the truth of
>>x2 results in no one ever being able to use djuno. :)
>
>I'm not sure what you mean by the smiley. Obviously people have used
>djuno agreeing with the x1 that the x2 is true.

I was just saying that the requirment to assert that x2 is true
independently of the epistemology x4 makes it nearly impossible to use
djuno given the difficulty of determining what is "true" outside of an
epistemology.  What does it mean for "the derivative of e^x is e^x" to
be true outside of mathematics?

[snip]
>I think that goes even beyond Lojbab's version. It would mean
>something like "x1 entertains proposition x2 about x3 derived from
>possible epistemology x4". Why keep the keyword "know" for such
>a different concept?

It was intended to be an examination of what would result if all
assertion or belief of the truth of the x2 or the validity of x4 in
producing truthful statements was dropped from djuno.  It was supposed
to be strange by acknowledging the imperfections of epistemologies.
Also, there seemed to be an abundance of gismu for varying stages of the
belief in the truth of a statement, but only djuno as a way to refer to
statements generated by an external epistemology, so it seemed possibly
instructive to separate truth from djuno.  It would also let one use
multiple contradictory epistemologies without the use of contradictory
djuno statements, or if you believe in some of the consequences of an
epistemology but not others.  One could easily construct English
versions of "know" from a truth-ambiguous djuno, or speak of knowledge
derived from epistemologies without committing oneself to the absolute
truthfulness of the statements thus derived, i.e., it seemed a useful
concept.

I'm not trying to convince anyone to use djuno like this, however.  It
would seem possible to achieve this affect with the use of the djuno
modals.  "X is true under epistemology E, and I assert it to be true."
I just haven't the faintest idea how to say that someone else knows that
X is true by E without implying that they believe it to be true outside
of E. "la djan. djuno le du'u broda vedu'o .ebu ku fo .ebu"?  Which
would not be the same as "la djan. djuno le du'u broda ku fo .ebu".
Knowing that something results from an epistemology is not the same as
believing that it is true.  If djuno simply meant "x1 knows x2 is true
of x3 under epistemology x4," then it would be simple to add belief to
that or not, but trying to express that I have indirect knowledge
through some epistemology without committing myself to its truth is
tricky with a true-x2 required djuno.

I'm not making a serious argument in any case. :)

--
Erik W. Cornilsen
thanatos@dimensional.com