Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>>> I can opine something as being true regardless of
>>>the metaphysics (or in spite of the metaphysics).
>>
>>I thought you had said that you could not conceive of something
>>being true regardless of the metaphysics.
>
>Arrgh, English is too difficult to argue in when someone is trying to
logically
>analyze every word you use.

i e'u mi'o pilno la lojban

>I meant this time that I can opine something is true without considering
>any particular metaphysics to apply.

I agree with that.

>If there is no metaphysics place, and we are dealing with a "truth", then
>that truth MUST be presumed to be truth-in-the-absolute.

But here you contradict yourself. You just said that when you opine
something is true, you need not opine it true-in-the-absolute.


> I am not sure that anyone in
>English would call it a conjunction to join two false statements into one
>false statement.

I'm sure most people would. For example:

"2+2=3 and 1+1=3" is a conjunction saying that "2+2=3" and
that  "1+1=3" are both true.

That statement is true, even though none of the subclauses are.

Anyway, many gismu refer to truths regardless of metaphysics,
as it should be.

>>You are arguing that we can't even create a lujvo with the place
>>structure "x1 knows truth x2 about x3 by epistemology x4".
>
>with x2 being "fact" I have no problem.

Neither do I. The problem is when you want it to be a fact under
each and every imaginable metaphysics. You don't require the
x1 of {mlatu} to be a cat under each and every imaginable
metaphysics, so why do it for {fatci}?

>>-that x1 is a person or other entity capable of cognition
>>-that x2 is a true proposition, that it can be arrived at by x4, that
>>  it is believed by x1, etc.
>>-that x3 is the subject of x2
>>-that x4 is way that leads to truths, that x1 used that way to arrive at
x2,
>>etc.
 >
>I have NO idea what youi mean by "x2 is a true proposition" as distinct
from
>"x2 is a proposition" in that description UNLESS you tell me whether it
>means lo fatci (in which case no metaphysics need apply) or it is lo jetnu
>(in which case a metaphysics MUST apply).

I mean "true" in the same sense that I claim {ti mlatu} to be true when
I assert {ti mlatu}. In the same sense that I opine {ti mlatu} to be true
when I opine that {ti mlatu}. You said yourself that in those cases
we are talking of true regardless of metaphysics but not in every
possible one. Perhaps you'd be more comfortable with
And's wording suggestion. Change to "x2 obtains" if you prefer.

co'o mi'e xorxes