Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>>I meant this time that I can opine something is true without considering
>>any particular metaphysics to apply.
>--More--
>
>I agree with that.
>
>>If there is no metaphysics place, and we are dealing with a "truth", then
>>that truth MUST be presumed to be truth-in-the-absolute.
>
>But here you contradict yourself. You just said that when you opine
>something is true, you need not opine it true-in-the-absolute.

Which is my very point.  "Opine something is true" does NOT mean that my
opinion IS true/a truth.  My statement that I am opining it in and of itself
recognizes that it may not be a truth because that is the nature of opinions.
In both Lojban (with jinvi) and English (with opine) there is no implication
that the x2/object is indeed true, and no need for me to qualify my opinion
with a metaphysics statement unless I choose to.  My statement is about
my act of forming/expressing an opinion, and NOT about "truth".  It is a
figure of speech to use the word "true" to talk about opinions, because we
don't generally express "opinions" as such when we know they are false
(unless we are playing devil's advocate in which case we are being ironical
- an interesting question, whether playing devil's advocate, expressing an
opinion you do not actually hold, is a kind of "jinvi" - what if we are not
sure and are throwing the opinion out on the table as a "trial balloon" is
that a "jinvi" - I would be inclined to think that both are jinvi IF we provide
support for them as true, whether we actually hold them to ^se
be true).

>> I am not sure that anyone in
>>English would call it a conjunction to join two false statements into one
>>false statement.
>
>I'm sure most people would. For example:
>
>"2+2=3 and 1+1=3" is a conjunction saying that "2+2=3" and
>that  "1+1=3" are both true.
>
>That statement is true, even though none of the subclauses are.

OK, in any case you have stated lo kanxe, even though all of the pieces are
false.  The wording of the definition is not intended to restrict the
places to true statements.  Again the word "true" is used a s a figure of
speech.

>Anyway, many gismu refer to truths regardless of metaphysics,
>as it should be.

But only jetnu and fatci actually say that the appropriate sumti actually IS
true.  Anything else is at most a context-based implicature and NOT part
of the semantics of the words in isolation.

>>>You are arguing that we can't even create a lujvo with the place
>>>structure "x1 knows truth x2 about x3 by epistemology x4".
>>
>>with x2 being "fact" I have no problem.
>
>Neither do I. The problem is when you want it to be a fact under
>each and every imaginable metaphysics. You don't require the
>x1 of {mlatu} to be a cat under each and every imaginable
>metaphysics, so why do it for {fatci}?

Because that is the definition of fatci.  fatci has no meaning distinct from
jetnu if it does not mean true-under-all-metaphysics.

For a statement "x1 mlatu", I do not include an explicit metaphysics because
the nature of language is to invoke a universe of discourse.  We recognize
that the statement's truth is dependent on that universe of discourse and
is qualified by any constraints implicitly built into that universe of doscourse
including metaphysics.  At least this is what I have gathered from earlier
debates, regarding, for example, "lo".  If I say that lo pavseljirna cu
tuple voda, is this statement "true"?  How about if I say lo pavyseljirna cu
^se
se tuple xada?  Is that statement any more true or false? The statement is
meaningless unless we invoke a universe of discourse with unicorns in them,
in which case those unicorns can have as many legs as I want them to have
since we aren't talking about the real world.

>I mean "true" in the same sense that I claim {ti mlatu} to be true when
>I assert {ti mlatu}.

When you "assert" ti mlatu then you are doing so within some previously
 established universe of discourse or you are invoking a new one.  The
 metaphysics is
dictated in either case.  But if >I< say "la xorxes cu xusra ledu'u ti mlatu"
>I< am not saying that "ti mlatu" is true, and I cannot necessarily say
under what metaphysics Jorge claims it is true, since he never specified.
It is not necessarily the case that the universe of discourse under which
Jorge claimed it is the current one - ledu'u allows for its own prenex and
hence change of context and quite frequently a true statement about your
assertions will require such an invocation of context.

Similarly, if I talk about la xorxes djuno x2, I am NOT saying that x2 is true
any more than I am saying that le se xusra is true merely by referrring to it.

If I say that la xorxes xusra x2, I am saying that YOU claim it is true,
and mychoice of metaphsyics for that statement about your nu xusra is
irrelevant to your mataphysics in making the assertion.

lojbab