Re: TECH: lambda and "ka" revisited

la .and. joi mi cusku be di'e casnu

> > Lojban ontology is such that there exist certain objects, called
> > "abstract objects", which can have various things predicated of
> > them.  The abstract objects called "events" can each have a "nu...kei"
> > predicated of them; in fact, they are called into existence because
> > of the "nu...kei" predicates.  (To be is to be the value of a variable:
> > so "da poi nu ... kei" says "there exists an event abstract object ...")
> 
> They seem like sets and bridi then.

Well, no.  Sets have properties like cardinality and membership; event
abstract objects do not.  They have properties like occurring-ism,
desirability, destroying (of something), being early (by some std), etc.

As for bridi, they are du'u-class objects, I think: intensions.
(That's "lo bridi", not the English word "bridi" which primarily refers
to a linguistic object.  Maybe I should change "bridi" to "briju'a"
everywhere in the reference grammar?)

> > However, the gismu "fasnu" is true only of such event abstract objects
> > as actually occur.  So "da poi nu la .ualas co'eli'o kei zo'u da fasnu"
> > is false because Wallace wasn't President, but the abstract object
> > encoding "Wallace was President" still exists, and we can say things
> > about it other than "da fasnu".  This does not mean that "da" can refer
> > to a nonexistent object (there are no nonexistent objects); it means that
> > it can refer to abstract objects which encapsulate non-occurring events.
> 
> I'm still rather unhappy about having eventy abstract objects but not
> appley abstract objects and forky abstract objects and so on.

These are "le su'u ... kei be lo plise/forca".  Arguably, the x2 of
"su'u" should be "lo ka" rather than just "lo".

> Whereas
> sets must be abstract, because they have no empirical correlates,
> events and forks are concrete (in the sense of being observable).

Forks are concrete: I can point to them, pick them up, etc.  Event
abstract objects are not.  As to observability, the gismu list is
silent on whether the x2 of "zgana" (the observed) is an event or
a concrete object.  I suspect that concrete objects are meant.
So

1)	do zgana le nu mi klama le zarci

is false, whereas

2)	do zgana mi poi klama le zarci

is true.

> Events and forks can be either real or imaginable, whereas for sets
> reality and imaginability amount to the same thing.

I again disagree, but from the other side now.  I can imagine the set
of all sets ("lo'i girzu"), but Cantor's paradox guarantees its nonexistence.

-- 
John Cowan					cowan@ccil.org
		e'osai ko sarji la lojban.