Bernard J. Ortcutt

la .and. joi mi cusku be di'e casnu

> >        Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy (transparent)
> 
>    da poi kea me la ortcutt zou la ralf krici kuau da mipzga
> 
> > and
> >        Ralph believes that Ortcutt is no spy (opaque)
>
>    la ralf krici kuau da poi kea me la ortcutt zou da mipzga

Not quite.  That trick works for "Ralph believes there are spies"
(i.e. "Ralph believes ((Ex) (x is a spy))") versus "Ralph believes
someone is a spy" (i.e. "((Ex) Ralph believes (x is a spy)").
But since "Ortcutt" refers to Ortcutt with all his properties,
it doesn't matter whether you bind "da" inside or outside the
opaque context:  Ralph simply does believe both that Ortcutt is a spy
and that he isn't, due to his false belief that Ortcutt and the sneaky
man are not identical.

The worst version of this (all of which comes from Quine, BTW) is
the full-fledged paradox of belief: we believe that each of our
beliefs is true (since to believe P is to believe that P is true),
and we also believe that some of our beliefs, we know not which,
are in fact false.  Rationality is simply not to be expected in this arena.
> 
> ---
> And
> 


-- 
John Cowan					cowan@ccil.org
		e'osai ko sarji la lojban.