Re: Bernard J. Ortcutt

[ucleaar <ucleaar@UCL.AC.UK>]

John:
> > >        Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy (transparent)
> >          da poi kea me la ortcutt zou la ralf krici kuau da mipzga
> > >        Ralph believes that Ortcutt is no spy (opaque)
> >          la ralf krici kuau da poi kea me la ortcutt zou da mipzga
> Not quite.  That trick works for "Ralph believes there are spies"
> (i.e. "Ralph believes ((Ex) (x is a spy))") versus "Ralph believes
> someone is a spy" (i.e. "((Ex) Ralph believes (x is a spy)").
> But since "Ortcutt" refers to Ortcutt with all his properties,
> it doesn't matter whether you bind "da" inside or outside the
> opaque context:  Ralph simply does believe both that Ortcutt is a spy
> and that he isn't, due to his false belief that Ortcutt and the sneaky
> man are not identical.

I'm not persuaded. I think that examples like these show that there needs
to be a distinction between the criteria that determine whether you are
or aren;t Ortcutt, and Ortcutt himself (i.e. whatever it is that satisfies
those criteria). This is my (all too probably naive) attempt to
distinguish between extensional Ortcutt and intensional Ortcutt.

So, without committing myself to {me} being the best device to do this,
I intend {da poi kea me la ortcutt zou la ralf krici kuau da mipzga}
to mean that the Ortcutt extension is, in the world of Ralf's beliefs,
a spy, while I intended {la ralf krici kuau da poi kea me la ortcutt
zou da mipzga} to mean that in the world of Ralf's beliefs, spyhood
is one of the characteristics of the Ortcutt intension.

Come to think of it, {me} has probably been defeating my purpose.
Hmm. Maybe instead of {la ralf krici kuau da poi kea me la ortcutt
zou da mipzga}, one should say:

   suo bua cei me la ortcutt zou la ralf krici da ge bua gi mipzga

or

   suo bua cei me la ortcutt zou la ralf krici ro bua cu mipzga

or something roughly like that.

> The worst version of this (all of which comes from Quine, BTW) is
> the full-fledged paradox of belief: we believe that each of our
> beliefs is true (since to believe P is to believe that P is true),
> and we also believe that some of our beliefs, we know not which,
> are in fact false. Rationality is simply not to be expected in this
> arena.

But it seems to make sense..!

  Ax, x is my belief: I believe that x is true
  I believe that not Ax x is my belief: x is true

  Each of my beliefs is believed by me to be true, but
  I believe that not every belief of mine is true.

cf

  Ax, x is my friend: I believe that x is a pervert
  I believe that not Ax x is my friend: x is a pervert

  Every friend of mine is believed by me to be a pervert, but
  I believe that not every friend of mine is a pervert

  [e.g. perhaps I've never stopped and wondered who my non-pervert
   friend is supposed to be]

Is there some fallacy I've fallen into here?

coo, mie And