Re: `at least one ' vrs `one or more'

[bob@MEGALITH.RATTLESNAKE.COM]

   Sorry, but this is the LOGICAL language and that means (among other
   things) that the sentences DO come out as examples of textbook
   logic.

Yes, this is a logical language, but you have not answered my
question, which is whether {lo} always expands to {da poi}?

As far as I can see, {lo} is a peculiar kind of operator, and does not
*always* expands to {da poi}.  In particular, {lo} as defined does not
always refer to all of its referents, whereas {da poi} does.

Yes, it may be the case that

    bob's arguments seem merely to be bogged
    down in the ambiguities of English ...

but neither you nor _The Complete Lojban Language_ have yet made a
clear case.  Indeed, I am basing my thesis on _The Complete Lojban
Language_.

(Incidentally, I agree that if {lo} always expands to {da poi}, then
you are right, as are Jorge and everyone else who has commented on
this.  My question has to do with whether it is proper to claim that
{lo} does always so expand.)

(Also, by the way, I agree that {to'e nelci} is best for dislike
compared to the other forms; and that {loi} would be the term of
choice when seeing or liking some cats.)


First the argument that {lo} does expand to {da poi}:

  * {lo} is a `veridicality operator'; that is to say, when you hear
    {lo} in an utterance, you know that you and your interlocutor have
    agreed, explicitly or implicitly, on a procedure for determining
    that the referents actually meet the description of the sumti, and
    that there is at least one of them.

    Since {lo} promises there is at least one entity that meets the
    description (in the universe of discourse agreed upon), and since
    the description constrains the referent, {lo} does expand to {da
    poi}: {da} implies existance, and {poi} attaches subordinate
    bridi with identifying information to {da}.

On the face of it, this looks fine and it is certainly how nearly
everyone has interpreted this.  I agree it is fairly convincing.

But now the counter argument:

  * {lo} is a `veridicality operator', as stated before.

    {lo} does not tell you the number or try to specify the number of
    the referents; all it guarantees is that there is at least one
    referent that meets the description of the sumti.

    Also, and this is critically important, {lo} do *not* guarantee to
    refer to *all* the referents.

    This is where {lo} differs from {da poi}.
    {da poi} *does* guarantee to refer to all the referents.

    The reason I interpret {lo} as not necessarily referring to all
    its referents is the that common English glosses for {lo} are `at
    least one' and `more or more'; and the default value in Lojban is
    {su'o lo ro} `at least one of all of those which really are',
    which is quite different from `all of those which really are'.
    (See Chapter 6.7)

    (As Cowan says, this default of {su'o lo ro} is not hard and fast;
    nor am I saying that all determination procedures do not refer to
    all; only that there is at least one with that characteristic.)

It is clear and agreed that if

    .i mi nelci da poi mlatu

then the negation is `I don't like any cats'.  No argument here.
As PC says, "for every cat x, it is not the case that I like x."

But the question revolves around the negation of

    mi nelci lo mlatu

where {lo mlatu} means `some number of real cats, but not necessarily all'.

The negation is translated as

    "for some number of cats x, not necessarily everyone, it is not the
    case that I like x."

This does not mean `I don't like any cats'!

Note I am not saying you cannot ever expand {lo} to {da poi}; indeed,
perhaps I should expect people to do that most of the time.

What I am proposing here is that {lo} is a `veridicality operator'
with certain characteristics that are different from {da poi} which is
also a kind of `veridicality operator'; and {lo} is not simply an
abbreviation for {da poi}.

Moreover, what I am proposing appears to me to be consistent with
_The Complete Lojban Language_, and the other interpretation is not.
I am sure that if John Cowan had meant `all' rather than `at least one
of' he would have said `all', as he did with {le}.

--

    Robert J. Chassell               bob@rattlesnake.com
    25 Rattlesnake Mountain Road     bob@ai.mit.edu
    Stockbridge, MA 01262-0693 USA   (413) 298-4725