Re: veridicality in English

[John Cowan <cowan@locke.ccil.org>]

la .and. cusku di'e

> I would say that since we agree that THE is sometimes nonveridical,
> and since an adequate theory of pragmatics can account all cases
> of THE if (even if) THE is assumed to be always nonveridical,
> the most parsimonious semantics of THE is to take it to always
> be nonveridical.

As you know, any argument dependent on a semantics/pragmatics
distinction {cuts no {ice|mustard}|butters no parsnips} with me.
Theories of pragmatics being rather unconstrained, they can patch
up arbitrarily bad (or arbitrarily arbitrary) semantics theories.

> I certainly don't share your judgement that the truth of
> Paul Revere's statement is contingent on whether the comers
> really are British.

Hmmm.  This reminds me of the dreaded "goat's legs" argument.
(Recap for newbies: if a goat has four legs, is it correct
to say "That goat has three legs?"  In English, maybe yes,
maybe no, probably not if under oath; in Lojban, no.)
 
> > But consider the following narrative:  "[1] A man went to the store
> > yesterday.  [2] The next day, he went to the office.  [3] Later, the
> > man flew to Singapore."  In this case "a man" and "the man"
> > must be either both non-veridical or both veridical; I hold that
> > they are both non-veridical.

I hold that "a man" in [1] is +specific -definite -veridical, and
means the same as "a certain man".  "The man" in [3] is then
+specific +definite (as a result of [1]) -veridical.

> I don't see why '"a man" and "the man" must be either both
> non-veridical or both veridical. I would have said the former
> is veridical and the latter isn't, and can't see the inadequacy
> of this.

On your view, then, if the man were really a woman:  [1] would be false,
[2] would have a presupposition failure, and [3] would still be true?

-- 
John Cowan	http://www.ccil.org/~cowan		cowan@ccil.org
			e'osai ko sarji la lojban