Re: veridicality in English

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

John:
> > I would say that since we agree that THE is sometimes nonveridical,
> > and since an adequate theory of pragmatics can account all cases
> > of THE if (even if) THE is assumed to be always nonveridical,
> > the most parsimonious semantics of THE is to take it to always
> > be nonveridical.
>
> As you know, any argument dependent on a semantics/pragmatics
> distinction {cuts no {ice|mustard}|butters no parsnips} with me.
> Theories of pragmatics being rather unconstrained, they can patch
> up arbitrarily bad (or arbitrarily arbitrary) semantics theories.

I know. I don't think we can pursue this debate. Your views
(articulated to me elsewhen) are pretty extreme on this matter,
and IMveryHO unfeasible (if one wants to study meaning).

> > I certainly don't share your judgement that the truth of
> > Paul Revere's statement is contingent on whether the comers
> > really are British.
>
> Hmmm.  This reminds me of the dreaded "goat's legs" argument.
> (Recap for newbies: if a goat has four legs, is it correct
> to say "That goat has three legs?"  In English, maybe yes,
> maybe no, probably not if under oath; in Lojban, no.)

The point is that in the context, it would be hard to take
the nonveridical component of Paul Revere's statement as
false yet felicitous. The nonveridicality of THE only shows
up in contexts where the description is technically false
but nonetheless successfully identifies the referent.

> > > But consider the following narrative:  "[1] A man went to the store
> > > yesterday.  [2] The next day, he went to the office.  [3] Later, the
> > > man flew to Singapore."  In this case "a man" and "the man"
> > > must be either both non-veridical or both veridical; I hold that
> > > they are both non-veridical.
>
> I hold that "a man" in [1] is +specific -definite -veridical, and
> means the same as "a certain man".

I agree it's -definite, and (is interpreted as) +specific. But
why do you say it's -veridical? Presumably you feel that [1]
would be true even if the referent were not a man. Can you
provide a context that might lead me to recognize that I share
your intuition?

> "The man" in [3] is then +specific +definite (as a result of [1])
> -veridical.

I'm not sure about the +specific - I'm somewhat inclined to
disagree but not for germane reasons. As for +definite and
-veridical, I of course agree, but these are properties of
THE rather than the referent.

> > I don't see why '"a man" and "the man" must be either both
> > non-veridical or both veridical. I would have said the former
> > is veridical and the latter isn't, and can't see the inadequacy
> > of this.
>
> On your view, then, if the man were really a woman:  [1] would be
> false,

Yes. Or at least [1] could not truthfully be used to refer to
the woman.

> [2] would have a presupposition failure,

Maybe. Or maybe it's like [1]: it couldn't truthfully be used to
refer to the woman.

> and [3] would still be true?

Yes (though depending on one's views on the logical nature of
presupposition, it might also be a presupposition failure).

--And