Re: What the *%$@ does "nu" mean?

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >What are the truth conditions on {da du`u/nu broda} and
> >{da na du`u/nu broda}?
>
> With no tenses the former is a pretty weak claim = probably that
> the relationship is possible.  But the bottom line is that it
> depends on the deaful dwfault tense.  I think this actually is true
> of most tenseless predications - you have to assume something about
> the tense or evaluating the truth conditions is rather difficult.

By "tense" do you mean "pu/ca/ba"? Or are you including "ka`e"
and its ilk? (I would call "ka`e" a "modal", but for some reason
the epithet "modal" is confyusingly applied to BAI.) What you
say doesn't make much sense if you mean only the temporal
"pu/ca/ba".

> If the former indicates possibility, then the latter indicates impossibility.
> Neither says anything about the nature of said relationship above and beyond
> the sumti that are filled in.
>
> Note that potentiality is a little stronger than me
> re possibility, and yet it
> is in another sense weaker.  It is in the nature of ducks that they can swim,
>
> so that ducks potentially swim.  But no
> a duck egg cannot swim, and yet it is
> potentially a duck and thus potentially a swimmer.  I don't claim to have
 explor
> ed even a fraction of the possible nuances of potentiality, but if you are
> looking for strict truth functionality, you really need to supply an
> appropriate CAhA.
>
> This should not have much to do with whatthe abstractors mean, but when you
> are asking me to talk about truth conditions of an abstract without sepec
> pecifying
> what potentiality you are assuming, it is very difficult.

This probelm, as you imply, applies as much to duck eggs as it
does to nu & du`u. So let's assume that each predicate is
supplied with the CAhA for "can-and-has" - "actual". What,
then, is an actual nu? (If you agree with John, then that's
all you need to say & I will know what you think.)

> >Do all nu exist in space-time?
>
> I dunno.  What does it mean to exist in space-time?    I'm not even
> sure what it means to exist independent of the question of
> space-time, when one gets into existence of the sort pertaining to
> logic (i.e. there exists an x ...). Previous discussions have
> stated that the universe of discourse can easily be a universe of
> the mind as opposed to the real world.  Does the mind exist in
> space time?  Do universes that exist only in the mind exist in
> space time? Events/relationships can certainly exist in the mind
> that cannot occur in reality e.g. lo nu [unicorn].  So if you ask
> me the truth value of da nu [unicorn], I have to wonder what the
> universe of discourse is before I can answer.

I am able to offer answers to these various questions, but I
want the debate to stay focused. It is sufficient to make a
distinction between abstract entities (such as the number 3) that
exist in all possible worlds, and "contingent" entities (such
as explosions, unicorns, flowers) that exist only in some possible
worlds.

As regards nu and du`u, I am aware of two clear views on this:

                nu        du`u/ka
Jorge & And     conting.  abstract
John            abst.     abst.

> Yet I can say that
> lo nu da [unicorn] na ca'a fasnu.

OK. But can you say: "lo ca`a nu da pavyseljirna cu na ca`a fasnu"?
John would say Yes, and Jorge would say No.

> >You can no more observe a ka than you can a number. A ka is
> >abstract.
>
> I certainly can observe loka datka sovda.

You can't. Or do you think you can observe {li ci}?

> Whether we choose to look at the
> fact that a duck laid the egg

How can you look at a fact?

> or that we have examined the genetic material of the cell nucleus
> and determined it to be duck chromosomes, or whatever otyher things
> we might need to determine to tell whether it might or might n ot be
> a duck egg.

Maybe you are thinking of observation as not just the gathering
of sensible (sensable) data but also as involving inferences
drawn from that data?

> >Noone knows for sure what {ni} means:
>
> I think I do, but no one believes me.  I can observe a ni in some conditions
> as well - e.g. when I can observe the degree to which a relationship extends.
> e.g. ni blanu
>
> >as you know, the
> >refgrammar is contradictory
>
> I don't "know" this as I took the opposite position in that debate and
> did not concede the point (and will not).

It is beyond rational dispute that {ni} and {jei} have
contradictory definitions. Refusing to concede this is just
unhelpful. I mean that given your leading role, you should
either persist in attempting to show those who disagree
with you the error of their views, or you should admit
yourself confused and opinionless.

> >I'm still not clear about what
> >you think {nu} means.
>
> I'm beginning to think that we will only "understand" what these things mean
> given lots of usage.  I can certainly tell "lo ka nu broda"  those properties
> by which I would judge that a given relationship is a nu broda.  But invoking
> ka is a little like saying "if it looks like a duck and quacks like one ...".

I could already induce plausible definitions of nu from usage,
but it might mean that we find words to be polysemous/homonymous
and that usage already violates the prescription of the
refgrammar.

> >> This is one
> >> reason why I like the aristotelian event categories - it allows me
> >> to talk about how I an observe/perceive an event, and reminds me
> >> that there are other possible ways to perceive many events.  I can
> >> see an explosion, but can imagine the "process of explosion" which
> >> happens at a rate too fast to consciously observe.
> >
> >Are these differences between the subtypes of nu truth-conditional?
> >The way you talk suggests they're not.
>
> I wonder what you mean by truth-conditional here.  Or maybe I would rather not
> know %^)
>
> It is possible to look at most events using any of the aristotelian persep
> ctives.  I often use a race as an example.  The Big Bang is an event that is
 usi
> ually
> seen as a point-event, but some physicists talk about it as a process.  I do
> not know how it can be viewed as an activity or a state though.  This doesn't
 m
> ean that it cannot be so viewed, merelythat it is not within my comprehension.

I can look at a mothball as an archipelago. That is not pertinent
to definitions of mothballhood and archipelagohood. How about
this question: Can something be simultaneously both a point-event
and an activity? (If yes, then I'd guess that these distinctions
involve what is called conventional implicature (like the
"contrast" meaning of _but_) rather than truth-conditional
meaning.

> >Anyway, I am totally and utterly clueless about what you think
> >the meanings of nu and certain other NUs are. Either their
> >meanings are really undefined (i.e. not yet defined) or they
> >are defined but whoever knows the definition has utterly
> >failed to communicate that knowledge to me or to anyone else
> >who is able or willing to contribute to this discussion.
>
> I think that ytou are looking for a definition at the level of a philosophical
> treatise and I am not a philospher, nor do I intend to play one on TV.
> pc can probably point to discussions in appropriate literature on events,
> and their nature and aristotelian subtypes, and maybe it will even answer
> your questions about truth conditionality.  But it is outside of my
> competence to argue the definition at a level that wuill satisfy you for
> rigor.

I am looking for an answer at a level of sophistication sufficient
to establish when nu is and isn't used properly.

--And