Re: ka'e

[JORGE JOAQUIN LLAMBIAS <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

 >>>We would not say that "lo remna ka'e vofli" even if we
>>>define that what someone does in an airplane or even more limitedly, a
>>>human propelled airplane is "flying".
 >
>As with most such cases, the ellipsized x2 has some value less
> releavnt to the claim, which is consistent with the predication being
true.
> In the case of this example, x2 is probably "da".

So why would we not say {lo remna ka'e vofli} meaning that
 {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji}?

>>I'm not comfortable with the concept of innateness.
>
>I think it is not a particularly "Western" concept.

What makes me uncomfortable is its seemeingly extreme
subjectivity.

>>Is a
>>sidewalk innately walkable by ants, for example?
>
>Yes.  and indeed most surfaces can be described as innately walkable.
>Butthere are exceptions (surface of the sun, of a cell wall, a frictionless
>surface).

Innately walkable by ants, you mean? Because most walls are not
innately walkable by humans, I would say.

Or consider the surface of the Moon. If {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji} is
false,
then {lo remna ka'e cadzu le lunra sefta} must be false as well.

And if making human fly is not an innate property of planes, then I don't
know what is.

>>The problem is how do you decide whether a relationship holds
>>"by nature" or by some other reason.
>
>I think that to answer this we have to get used to thinking of properties
of
>predications (loi ka broda) instead of properties of sumti.

As an aside, {loi ka broda} are properties of predications only when
broda is a selbri that accepts a predication as one of its arguments.
For example: {le ka ce'u jetnu} "being true", {le ka djuno ce'u}, "being
known", etc.

>It seems clear to
>me that those properties we use to determine the truth of a bridi are loi
>ka bridi, and  are the innate properties of the bridi.

The properties of being a bridi? {lo remna ka'e vofli lo vinji} has the
property of being a bridi. How do you use that property to determine the
truth of the bridi?

>Now it seems that if a bridi would hold except for the value of one sumti
>(it would hold with some specific na'ebo le sumti, then we would ascribe
the
>flaw in the bridi to that sumti.

I've no idea what you're getting at, but let's see if I understand what
you're
saying. Consider {mi klama le zarci}. Now, let's say it is John, not me, who
goes to the market, and that I go to the park. So what is the flaw of the
bridi,
is it {mi} because it should be {la djan}, or is it {le zarci}, because it
should
be {le panka}?

> If in turn that particular sumti, out of all
>the sumti of its "kind" makes the bridi false, while others of the kind
make
>it true, then we would see the referent of that sumti as failing to uphold
>the innate properties of the typical member of that type.

I don't understand. Could you give examples, please?

co'o mi'e xorxes