Re: Knowledge and belief

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>No argument against that. You can claim djuno as long as you
>presuppose jetnu. If later you find out that jetnu doesn't hold, then
>you will withdraw the djuno claim as well.

But this I think is wrong.  if I claim djuno, and we agree that it is
true now, but then if it turns out that it is false (through presupposition
failure or some other reasoning) then at that time we can say that it is
false, but I do  not see how we can make the former knowing "false".  What
has happened is that the universe of discourse aboiut which the former
claim was made, turned out not to be the real world.  This makes the
statement not far removed from "I know that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker
Street".

In any event, WITH the epistemology place present, something false by one
epistemology (hindsight) can be true by another epistemology.

I find it hard to accept that a statement can be true at time T, and then at
time X which is after T, we can say that it was NOT true at time T.  It seems
to me that there are presuppositions in every sentence, and involing hidden
presuppositions in order to make things work out makes it hard to claim that
the language is working as a "logical language".  If there are presuppositions,
that fact should be plainly evident in the claim.

I am also bothered by the fact that time is critical to the truth of such a
claim. Lojban of course has tense optional.  I am bothered that truth of a given
proposition at a given time could depend on when the proposition is stated.

lojbab