Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>That we make an explicit distinction between fatci and jetnu which also
>brings in a form of subjectivity, we recogbnize that subjective truth is
>possible.

Yes.

> The problem is that if one accpets subjectivity as possible
>then it necessarily becomes a default because you cannot assume that
>anyone else will necessarily hold the same truths/accept the same
>epistemologies as you.

That doesn't follow at all. It is perfectly possible to accept subjectivity
as possible and at the same time assume that someone else
will share your beliefs. I don't see the inconsistency. In fact, if you
don't
accept some kind of agreement with others, I don't see how you
could believe you're communicating anything. If you don't suppose
that your idea of a mlatu is more or less the same as mine, what do
you expect me to understand when you say {ta mlatu}?

 >Given the baseline, I cannot change the keyword even if i wanted to.

I was not talking about the keyword, although I don't see much point
in keeping obsolete keywords frozen. (There are some that are misleading,
for example the keyword for {cinmo} is "emotion" instead of  "feels emotion.
I have seen {le cinmo} used more than once when {le se cinmo} was
meant, probably because of the keyword.) Anyway, the problem in the
case of djuno is not only the keyword but the full definition.

>  Given that you and others seem to think that
>"is convinced" would be a meaning change, I am not sure such an unqualified
>synonym addition is permitted without an explanatory note indicating
controversy

Also, if you change to "is convinced"  we would be left with no word to
express
the concept of  "know", which seems like a useful one. How about a lujvo for
"is convinced"? Something like:

        bityji'i [birti jinvi]: j1=b1  j2=b2  j3  j4
         "x1 is convinced that x2 is true about x3 based on evidence x4."


>>>that we assume that our own
>>>menatla state has any relevance to reporting another's mental state.
>>
>>Our mental state is relevant to reporting anything at all. To that extent
>>it is relevant to reporting another's mental state or another's redness,
>>for example.
>
>And YOU are asking ME why Lojban is inherently subjective by default?

What I meant is that there is nothing inherently subjective about
Lojban or about English (or objective for that matter). Our beliefs can
be subjective, but "subjective" is not a category that applies to languages.
Even if you mean that assertions in a language are subjective, that still
applies to the assertions no matter in which language they be made,
so not to Lojban or to English.

>Taking this argument to the ultimate, the speaker's mental state is the
ONLY
>thing relevant.  If my menatl state attributes redness to you than you are
>red!  There is no logic, because the rules of logic are whatever I want
them
>to be.  Humpty Dumpty rules all.

Indeed, sometimes it seems as if you take logic to be whatever you want
it to be. How ever does it follow that your attributing redness to me makes
me red? As ~mark pointed out some time back this thread, you seem to
be confusing assertions with truth. Your mental state is relevant to your
asserting that I am red. Your asserting that I am red does not make
me red, even if you believe it is true.

>The only thing I think MY mental state should have to do with what
>la xorxes djuno, is that I should be able to report that la xorxes finds le
>ve djuno a suitable epistemology for knowing le se djuno.  le se djuno is
>its own abstraction, with its own prenex, and need have no tie to my
>mneatl word at all, only to la xorxes.

I know that's what you think, yes. You also know that's not what I think.

Your opinion as to the meaning of {djuno} is based on what your
intentions were of what it should mean.

My opinion as to its meaning is based on what the gi'uste says it means.

What the gi'uste says does not agree with what your intentions were,
so there is nothing strange in our having different opinions.

>If there is ANY debate as to the truth
>of a proposition possible, under any epistemology or metaphysics, then
>it is not a fatci.

Isn't that a bit strong? Is that claim of yours a fatci? If I say:

        le du'u la lojbab cu rirni re da cu fatci
        "That lojbab has two children is a fact."

are you going to categorically assert that that claim is false?
Under any and every metaphysics? Seems to me like you can't have
it both ways.

>Since you seem to inject mental states into all
>assertions then nothing imaginable can be false.

I'm not sure what you mean by injecting mental states into
assertions. Certainly lots of things imaginable can be false.
For example, that you have only one child is false.

co'o mi'e xorxes