Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

>> I suppose you don't have an answer then
>>for what is it that makes some sentences  change meaning so
>>drastically when you replace "is convinced" with "knows". Other than
>>presupposition of truth.
>
>I attribute it NOT to presuppostion of truth, but presupposition that truth
>is objective.  We use "convinced" for subjective areas, and "know" for
>objective areas" in English for contrast, and when you put the two in
>juxtaposition, this suggests such a contrast, and therefore the
>"convincing" proposition is seen as weaker than the "known" one.  When
>not place in contrast, the two words are more likely to be used
>interchangeably.

I think you are wrong. Consider this very subjective area:

(1) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter knows that she does.
(2) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter is convinced that she does.

Why is (1) still odd and (2) still ok? No matter whether the
claimed knowledge is subjective or objective, when it is
presupposed to be false "knows" fails and  "is convinced"
doesn't.

 >>>General semanticists that deny the mathematical axiom of identity will
not
 >>>necessarily agree that "x=x" is a fatci
>>
 >>[BTW, I notice that you are even using the word {fatci} in your English
>>discourse. Surely it can't be so useless if you find it of use even when
>>speaking a language other than Lojban!]
>
>Huh, I was using it as an example to show that "'x=x' cu fatci" is not
>valid because there are metaphysical principles that deny it.

You are using the word, therefore it is not useless. Even if you
use it just to express your view that nothing is an absolute fact,
you have found a use for it.

 >>You seem to be under the misimpression that the presupposition of truth
>>of the x2 of djuno is somehow a hidden assumption. It is not. It is as
overt
>>as it can be.
>
>It is hidden in the sense that
>la djan cu djuno da
>seems to change in truth vakue according to your definition based on
>who says it.

Not at all. Its truth value is independent of who says it. It only depends
on whether da is true, whether John believes da to be true, whether he is
justified in such a belief, but I think all this has been stated before.

> If George is willing to presuppose that da jetnu
>then the statement is true, but if Jeff is not than the statement is not
>true.

No, George and Jeff have nothing to do with it. Their beliefs will of
course affect their choice of words, but that is not exclusive of the
word {djuno} at all.

>A presumption requires a presumer, and whose presumption matters- the
>speaker's, the listener's, or le djuno.  I contend that only le djuno's
>presumption can be relevant since the speaker is not always knowlable, and
>likewise the lset of listeners, and it seems unacceptable that truth of
>a proposition be NECESSARILY based in such a way.

But the beliefs of the speaker do NOT enter into the evaluation of truth
of the proposition. The beliefs of the speaker may be relevant to judge
the honesty of the assertion, but not its truth. To evaluate the truth you
only need to evaluate whether the subclause is true, whether le djuno
believes it, and whether le djuno has a valid justification for believing
it.

> Indeed, what seems to
>be the case is that the truth of
>la djan cu djuno da
>(leka jetnu) has become based on something not in the place structure of
>jetnu, in particular the speaker or listener or whoever you feel needs to
>be the presumer of les se djuno in order for
>le du'u la djan cu djuno da cu jetnu
>to be valid.

I can't follow that paragraph, I think something was cut off.

co'o mi'e xorxes