Re: Summary of summaries on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

> >They might arguably be better with a metaphysics place (in addition
> >to the x4), but they don't have to have one. The meaning of a
> >predicate never dictates obligatorily the place structure. So, for
> >example, you can take any gismu and define another brivla with one or
> >more fewer sumti than the gismu as synonymous with the gismu.
>
> But then you are saying that the omitted place is not necessarily relevant
> or even required for the meaning.

No: you're not; you are mistaken. You cannot logically reason from
the meaning to the syntactic place-structure. But you can reason from
meaning to place-structure on grounds of utility: it is desirable that
certain semantic arguments be expressible by a syntactic sumti place.

> >As for whether a brivla whose sense involves notions of "truth" is
> >necessarily better off with a metaphysics place, I'm not sure that it
> >is. I cannot see any difference between
> >
> >     x1 is true by metaphysics x2
> >
> >and
> >
> >     x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2
> >
> >- either I'm not thinking straight, or it is the case that every
> >predicate has an equal claim to a metaphysics place.
>
> If x1 is an abstraction (which du'u is) then there are two possible levels
> in which to insert a metaphsyics place
>
> (x1 is a cat by metaphysics x2) is true by metaphsyics t2
>
> It would seem possible (not sure if plausible) to use a different
> metaphysics for jetnu "is true" in some contexts, than one would use for
> "is a cat".

How so? A qualitatively different metaphysics? (i.e. one different in
kind?)

> If it is NOT possible/plausible then this seems to be a unique property of
> truth/falsity claims,

Do you mean that "NOT"?

> or perhaps one is being constrained to apply
> only one kind of metaphysics in any context.  I am nowhere near the
> kind of philosopher to know if this is done (and it may depend on what one
> considers to be a metaphysics).  But it is this dual level that is the basis
> for my arguing acgainst the dependent claim that "x2 is jetnu/fatci" in
> djuno as being implicit.

You really need to be clearer about the nature of this dual level if
you're going to base an argument on it. I can't follow your reasoning
yet.

> IT seems to me that the very acknowledging that
> there exist many metaphysics, renders the possibility that I would apply
> a different metaphysical standard to the truth fo x2 than to the truth of the
> djuno claim that involves that x2.

This may be so, but I cannot see why the same does not apply to any
bridi containing multiple bridi. Are you, for example, actually
denying that {jetyju`o} (on Don's definition) could be a possible
brivla?

You seem to be attempting to direct a philosophical attack on the
jetyju`o meaning for {djuno}, but we should distinguish between an
argument that the jetyju`o meaning is inherently flawed, and an
argument that the jetyju`o meaning is inappropriate for {djuno} (as
opposed to some lujvo or other).

The former argument, which seems to be the one you are trying to
make, is far more general in its application than {djuno}. The latter
argument pertains only to {djuno}, but I am still waiting for it to
be made coherently (though hopefully I will this afternoon have time
to do so myself in an attempt to bring the thread to a satisfactory
conclusion).

--And.