Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>We have a proposition x2.
>
>I can assert x2, which MEANS that I am saying it is true.

Right. It is perfectly possible for you to assert that it is true with no
mention of any metaphysics.

> It is the
>essence of assertion/xusra that it claims truth.  there is no metaphysics
>involved here - it is the definition of "assert".

Right. So truth can be claimed without singling out any metaphysics.
Just as you can claim that something is a cat without bringing in a
metaphysics. We could make up a lujvo that means "x1 claims that
x2 is a cat", lets say {mlatyxusra}. Then I can say:

                    mi xusra ko'a
                    I assert that koha is true.

                    mi mlatyxusra ko'e
                    I assert that kohe is a cat.

In neither case am I making mention of the metaphysics by which
they are a truth or a cat.

>To assert that x2 is true under metaphysics x3 is a partilcular kind of
>assertion (at least as I understand the English.  You are saying that x2 is
>true under a particular metaphysics, perhaps as distinguished from some
>other metaphysics.

Right. Just like you could assert that x2 is a cat under a particular
metaphysics as distinguished from some other metaphysics.

>  You actually could express your 3-placer as
>x1 asserts le du'u x2 jetnu x3
>as an exact equivalent.  The metaphysics is tied only to the x2's truth and
>has nothing to do with the act of asserting itself.

Right.

>I can assert something you and I might consider false, but I am still
> asserting it AS true.

Right.

>xusra is more akin to cusku than it is to any discussion of truth.

The main difference between {xusra} and {cusku} is precisely the
truth component, isn't it?

>>"x1 thinks that x2 is true of x3
>>in metaphysics x5 based on grounds x4"
>
>Again, I don't agree.

Neither do I of course. That was what your previous post seemed
to require. I'm glad we agree about this point at least.

> I can opine something as being true regardless of
>the metaphysics (or in spite of the metaphysics).

I thought you had said that you could not conceive of something
being true regardless of the metaphysics. Something that you
opine is a cat regardless of the metaphysics, you would call
{mlatu}. What would you call something you opine is true
regardless of the metaphysics?

> Netaphysics determines
>whether it really IS truth and not necessarily  how I think about truth
>(indeed most people do not consider metaphysics at all when
>contemplating what is true and what is not).

Indeed! I completely agree.

>On the other hand, I can form an  opinion as to whether x2 would be true
under
>a particular metaphysics which I may or may not consider a valid
metaphysics.

Right.

>THis is the sense I get out of your place structure - again it is
>equivalent to x1 jinvi ledu'u x2 jetnu x5 kei about x3 on grounds x4
>The metaphysics has nothing to do with the act of opining.

Right.

>This then correlates back to true-djuno which I understand as being
>x1 djuno le du'u x2 jetnu metaphysics x5 kei about x3 under epistemology x4

Only if you want to make the metaphysics explicit. As in the case of
xusra and jinvi, neither version of djuno requires an explicit metaphysics
place.

 >I can also assert that something is truth-in-the-absolute (i.e. fact).

What would be the difference between asserting that something is
truth-in-the-absolute and asserting that it is true. I.e. what is the
difference between:

            mi xusra le du'u ti mlatu
            I assert that this is a cat.

            mi xusra le du'u fatci fa le du'u ti mlatu
            I assert that it is a fact that this is a cat.

Is the second anything but a more emphatic version of the first?

>Or I can assert something is true under metaphysics m1, but whether the is
>assertion is true or not might me evluated using metaphysics m2.

I agree.

>>>kanxe, and other words pertaining to logical operations are presumed to
>>>have be associated with logical epistemologies/metaphysics.
 >>
>>        le du'u la cev cu vrude gi'e cimni cu kanxe
>>        le du'u la cev cu vrude kei le du'u la cev cu cimni
>>        "God is good and infinite" is a conjunction stating that
>>        both "God is good" and "God is infinite" are true.
>>
>It is the nature of le ka kanxe that x1 is a conjunction of x2 and x3, and
>that nature is totally independent of whether or not x2 and x3 are really
true
>or whether x1 is true for that matter.  A logician might say that kanxe
>should have been defined as
>x1 is a conjunction composed of x2 and x3 which is true if x2 and x3 are
>both true
>or something like that.  But lay people might not understand and get
confused
>by a repetition of x2 and x3.  Again, kanxe is about conjunction, and not
>about truth.

Of course, but the point is that it involves truths without involving
metaphysics, which makes perfect sense, just as something can
involve cats without involving metaphysics.

When we say that x1 is true iff x2 and x3 are both true, we are taking
for granted that there are things that can be true.

>> When you say {ko'a djuno ko'e} you are making
>>(among others) assertion ko'e without any consideration of the
>>metaphysics involved.
>
>"I" am making no such assertion, because djuno is not about MY
>consideration
>of truth; it is only about x1's concept of truth and x1's use of
>epistemology x4.

With your definition of djuno that is true. What we are arguing at this
point is whether a definition of djuno with true-x2 is possible at all.
You are arguing that we can't even create a lujvo with the place
structure "x1 knows truth x2 about x3 by epistemology x4".

>*I* am not asserting x2; I am asserting something about
>the relationship between x2 and x1, x3, and x4.

Right. Under the above definition you'd be asserting:

-that x1 is a person or other entity capable of cognition
-that x2 is a true proposition, that it can be arrived at by x4, that
  it is believed by x1, etc.
-that x3 is the subject of x2
-that x4 is way that leads to truths, that x1 used that way to arrive at x2,
etc.

That relationship is indeed possible, even if it is not the one you
intended for {djuno}.

>Surely I can say that
>la djef cu xusra le du'u mi patfu voda
>Jeff asserts that I am the father of 4.
>which I know to be a falsehood.

Of course you can.

 >Likewise
>la djef cu djuno le du'u mi patfu voda
>Jeff knows that I am the father of 4.
>Whether the djuno proposition is true or not does not depend on the truth
>of the x2 proposition (to me who states the bridi)

Of course that applies to the definition of djuno that you support.
It does not apply to the English translation that you give, and it does
not make the other definition of djuno incoherent.

co'o mi'e xorxes