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Re: any? (response to Desmond)



The following is mainly to clarify my use of 'indeterminate' and is
probably of little relevance to lojban.

Desmond:
>>> A feature of dr is the fundamental role in it of what I call
>>> *indeterminates*.  For example, if a and b are indeterminates of the sort
>>> number, then the *unquantified* sentence
>>>         a^2 - b^2 = (a-b)(a+b)
>>> is true.  a and b are *potential entities* of the sort number.  This may be
>>> the only information we have about them, or we may have total information
>>> about them (such as that a=5 and b=3) or we may have partial information
>>> about them (such as that a is positive).  In each case our sentence remains
>>> true: it is true by virtue solely of the fact that a and b are numbers.
>>>
Jorge:
>>This is not the case for Lojban {lo}.
>>
>>For example:
>>
>>        lo remna cu mamta mi
>>        A human being is mother to me
>>
>>is true.  Not by virtue of the fact that {lo remna} is a human being,
>>but because of the fact that there is one human being that is in
>>relationship {mamta} with {mi}.
>>
I don't think that conflicts with lo remna being an indeterminate.  A
sentence involving an indeterminate may be true for various reasons.  Your
sentence is true in the presence of the information that humans have
mothers.  Everyone has that information so everyone agrees.  (My "it is
true by virtue solely of the fact that a and b are numbers" may be
misleading.  Add "and addition of numbers is associative, and ...".)

Desmond:
>>> On
>>> the other hand, in the absence of specific information about a and b, the
>>> sentence
>>>         a^2 - b^2 = (a-b)^2
>>> (though a perfectly acceptable sentence) is neither true nor false.
>>>
lojbab:
>I think that this claim is a definition and not a given.  You know they
>are numbers, and you know that there is at least one number assignment
>that could make it true (b=0).  You lack specific information as to
>whether that (or any other specific value) is a permissible value of
>"b".
>
I don't understand "I think that this claim is a definition and not a
given."  I was talking about the way that a particular programming language
will evaluate something.  If a and b are indeterminates of the sort
unicorn, then  in the absence of specific information about a and b, the
sentence
         the number of horns of a = the number of horns of b
(though a perfectly acceptable sentence) is neither true nor false.  It
would become true, for example in the presence of the information that a=b
(or that unicorns have one horn).   Even if there are no unicorns.  Weird,
maybe, but I'm just following through the consequences of the dr rules.
It's just what you get when you entertain potential unicorns.  Discourse
about imagined worlds is perhaps rather like the kind of discourse you can
have with our kind of programming language in that the rules are made up
and must be followed.

lojbab:
>..."In the absence of specific
>information" applies much more often to mathematical problems than to
>linguistic ones.
>
Surely not.  I may know a lot about Charles and Diana but not know whether
they live in the same county.  I lack that specific information.  For me
the sentence "Charles and Diana live in the same county." is neither true
nor false.  Of course *in fact* it is either true or false, but that is not
a linguistic matter.  (I like the idea that language and reality are
independent worlds, that language is for conveying and analysing
information and that matters of fact only impinge on language by
influencing what we find worth saying.  Philosopher's might have a field
day with this.  I'd better retract it.)

Jorge:
>>From what I understand, your "a" need not have a value
>>obtainable even in principle.
>>
Right.  But we would like whatever we say about an indeterminate unicorn to
be of value when a unicorn happens to show up.  If we are agreed that
unicorns have one horn we'll argue with anyone who says that a cow is a
unicorn.  'A unicorn' denotes a potential animal, an animal that could be.

lojbab:
>But how do you evaluate a story:
>
>"lo nanmu cu klama co jibni lo ninmu .i le nanmu cu cpedu le ninmu lenu
>kansa klama le dansu nunsalci"
>
>"A man goes near a woman.  And the man asks the woman to
>accompanyingly-go to the dance-celebration."
>
>Now what do you make of this?  Is the first sentence inherently true
>because at least one man has at some time gone near a woman?  If so, it
>makes "lo" rather useless.  I think that there may indeed be a 'typing'
>going on here, and the 2nd sentence "le" is an instantiation that tells
>us that the first sentence WAS referring to a specific man and a
>specific woman.
>
This makes good sense to me. Could one put it like this?  In the first
sentence "a man" and "a woman " are indeterminates about which we have no
information except their types (and all the agreed properties that go with
their types).  In the second sentence some more information about these
same indeterminates is expressed.  "the man" (and "le nanmu"?) tell us that
whatever entity may have been referred to in the first sentence is also the
entity referred to in the second.  English, though clear, is rather clumsy
about this.  Standard mathematical usage would be "m goes near w.  And m
asks w to ...."  English would require "the first man" and "the second man"
to refer again to "a man" and "another man".

John Cowan:
>Nah.  Too late now.  Use "le" throughout instead.
>
That also makes sense to me.  I would be interested in the simplest lojban
rendering of
(1)  A man is eating an icecream.  The man is happy.
(2)  Two people are in a room.  The man is happy.
(3)  A man may eat an icecream.  A man may be happy.
(4)  A man may eat an icecream.  That would make him happy.

Desmond