Re: What the *%$@ does "nu" mean?

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >abstract entities (such as the number 3) that
> >exist in all possible worlds,
>
> The number 3 does not exist in the universe of discourse which is restricted
> to the set of even numbers.

What is a universe of discourse?

> >> >You can no more observe a ka than you can a number. A ka is
> >> >abstract.
> >>
> >> I certainly can observe loka datka sovda.
> >You can't. Or do you think you can observe {li ci}?
>
> Yes.  li ci cu ka cimei
> Indeed it seems practically definitional of a number that it be the sole
> property of X-ness.

In what sense are you *observing* li ci? I'm not claiming you
can't *talk about* li ci, or say that it is a property of
threesomes.

> So if I am observing a set of three theings, I am observing lo ka cimei
> as well as li ci.  I think that this is in the nature of "observing" that
> it can include abstract properties.  I do not claim that "mi renro li ci"
> would make any sense.
>
> Now I can also observe concretes as well as abstractiuons.  The brain is a
> pwerful device.

You seem to be using "observe" to mean "x1 concludes that x2
is the case on the basis of observing x3".

If you hear a cough, a trombone and a rustle, are you hearing
li ci?

> >> Whether we choose to look at the
> >> fact that a duck laid the egg
> >
> >How can you look at a fact?
>
> (Well ,it works in English %^)
> We can look at/observe/analyze/understand a relationship.  A relationship
> can be factual.  In which case transitively we are looking at a fact.
> I guess.

You are mixing up metaphorical extensions of meaning from
sensory to cognitive senses of "look at". Now that really is
malglico.

> >> or that we have examined the genetic material of the cell nucleus
> >> and determined it to be duck chromosomes, or whatever otyher things
> >> we might need to determine to tell whether it might or might n ot be
> >> a duck egg.
> >
> >Maybe you are thinking of observation as not just the gathering
> >of sensible (sensable) data but also as involving inferences
> >drawn from that data?
>
> The brain undoubtedly makes inferences from data beofre we are aware that it
> has done so.  This is a different sort of inference than the logical
> inferences that we might make once we have accepted that the data is valid.

True. But I still contend that what you see is the stimulus and
not the inference. {mi viska lo cukta} means "there is a book
and I see it". It doesn't mean "on the basis of visual stimulus]
I infer that there is a book". (Though it would often be appropriate
to say such a thing.)

> >> >as you know, the
> >> >refgrammar is contradictory
> >>
> >> I don't "know" this as I took the opposite position in that debate and
> >> did not concede the point (and will not).
> >
> >It is beyond rational dispute that {ni} and {jei} have
> >contradictory definitions. Refusing to concede this is just
> >unhelpful. I mean that given your leading role, you should
> >either persist in attempting to show those who disagree
> >with you the error of their views, or you should admit
> >yourself confused and opinionless.
>
> I admit to being confused as to how jei got broughjt into this - you asked me
> about ni.  Since they are "defined" (to the extent that is true)
 independently,
> I cannot understand howthe definitions COULD be contradictory.

The definitions of {jei} and {ni} are independent, but they are
both defined contradictorily, and their definitions are
contradictory in the same way.

> I am never opinionless.  I may be clueless.  My opinion may be nonsense.
> But I will indeed form an opinion, and then again, I will change it faced
> with contradiction if need be.  I do not claim to be as logical as the
> language tries to be, even if my Lojbanic name suggest that I am logically
> clean %^).

OK, though it might then be a good idea for you to disclaim
authority rather more ostentatiously than you have been doing.

> >I can look at a mothball as an archipelago. That is not pertinent
> >to definitions of mothballhood and archipelagohood. How about
> >this question: Can something be simultaneously both a point-event
> >and an activity? (If yes, then I'd guess that these distinctions
> >involve what is called conventional implicature (like the
> >"contrast" meaning of _but_) rather than truth-conditional
> >meaning.
>
> pc could disagree, but I think that an event could be viewed as either an
> activity or as a point event.  They would have different properties,
> however.  And activity would have subevents within it, repeated many times,
> whereas a point event denies the existence (or at least the relevance) of any
> substructure to the event.

I guess you think that "x is a point-event and an activity" must
be false, then. In that case, the semantic difference between the
subtypes of nu would be truth-conditional, and your assertion
that you can view a race as a point-event or an activity is
no more significant than my assertion that you can view a
raven as a writing-desk or as a handsaw.

> > But it is outside of my
> >> competence to argue the definition at a level that wuill satisfy you for
> >> rigor.
> >
> >I am looking for an answer at a level of sophistication sufficient
> >to establish when nu is and isn't used properly.
>
> Given previous discussions, I may not be able to satisfy you.  And it is no
> longer my job to do so %^).

OK. I think we can conclude that noone really has a definition
of nu that is consistent with usage and the general principles
of Lojban (such as No Homonymy). So our next step should be
to establish what the best definition of nu would be, and how
usage should change to conform to it.

--And