Re: djuno and ce'u

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

> >     mi zanru lenu ledu'u broda cu jetnu
> >
> >is pretty much equivalent to
> >
> >     mi zanru lenu broda
>
> It is a semantic inference.  And in Lojban, semantic inferences are not
> (generally) prescribed. On the other hand
>
> >> If I approve of something, then I approve of it being a true
> >> proposition.
> >
> >That's not *necessarily* so, unless you mean it as a claim about
> >your personal approval criteria.
>
> This sounds like a contradiction of what you just said above about their
> supposed equivalence.

How so?

> >> >x2 of djuno = fact = true proposition.
> >> >du`u = proposition.
> >{djuno ko`a} entails that ko`a is (a) a proposition, and (b) true.
> >
> >There is nothing wrong with {ko`a djuno le du`u broda}, but it claims
> >that (a) ko`a believes le du`u broda, and (b) le du`u broda is true.
> >
> There is nothing about the nature of Lojban that requires x2 of djuno to
> be a true proposition.

There is iff word meanings are part of the nature of Lojban.

> There seems to be something about your
> interpretation of djuno (or maybe even the English "know") that presumes
> that something known is "true".

That's right. That's what "know" means. And both usage and the
baselined gismyste show that "djuno" means "know".

> The only basis internal to the language
> that I can see for such an assumption is that the x4 place,
> epistemology, combined with the x2 place, resembles that of jetnu.
> Otherwise you are projecting the semantics of English or something else
> onto the Lojban.

If Lojban word X is defined in terms of English word Y, and if
usage bears out this definition, then it seems appropriate to
project the semantics of English onto Lojban.

> I of course believe that there is no prescribed semantics for any of the
> places - the semantics is inferrable from usage and syntax.  The syntax
> is prescribed and in some cases there are prescriptions for usage.  But
> I resist extending those prescriptions by analysis without actual usage.
> Anything decided beyond the prescription must be description.

My remarks on {djuno} are descriptive.

> >[Yes yes yes I realize that (b) might in fact be a presupposition rather
> >than a claim, but that's another story.]
>
> No it isn't.  It's a major point. se djuno != jetnu.  There are two
> other places involved, one of which, the knower, is prone to
> subjectivity.

Possibly jetnu = se djuno zi`o zi`o zi`o.

I accept that it does matter whether the truth of x2 of djuno is
presuppositional, since if it is then {na se djuno} also entails
{jetnu}. But it's still another story.

> >> How does zanru differ from djuno?  If I know something, then I know
> >> that it is a true proposition.
> >
> >Not exactly: If you know something, then (a) it is true, and
> >(b) you believe it to be true.
>
> This is not even true for English.  To be seasonal, many people "know"
> that "Christ was born on Christmas Day", even though there is
> considerable evidence even in the scriptural accounts that suggest
> otherwise.  The scholars who interpret otherwise, and who know the
> history of the association of Christmas with Dec. 25, "know" that Christ
> was NOT born on Christmas Day.

I don't see how you are trying to make your point. By using
scarequotes you are implicitly attributing the belief in the
truth of the knowee to the knower rather than yourself.

If you tell me that you find

  He knows that Christ was born on Christmas Day and she knows that
  Christ was born on Christmas day.

acceptable, then I will not believe you. If several others tell
me they find it acceptable then we will have discovered a variety
of English that so far as I know has not been hitherto observed.

> Neither of these is a "presupposition", but is belief supported by
> epistemologically valid evidence according to their particular
> epistemologies.  But supported by evidence does not equal truth even
> within a single epistemology (and English of course does not acknowledge
> as Lojban does that truth is always based on epistemology).
>
> >I am not sure why {djuno} was made to be like {know} rather than
> >{believe}, but that's pretty clearly how things are now.
>
> I am not sure what you mean.  We have "krici" for believe, which is
> identical in the first 3 places to djuno, but requires no
> epistemological place, because no epistemologically based evidence is
> required for belief.

It may be that no epistemologically based evidence is required for
{krici}. But it is required for belief.
The difference between the words _know_ and _believe_ is that only
the former is "factive": only it presupposes the truth of the
complement.

> I think we have to clarify that there are many more than two
> distinctions possible in Lojban regarding "truth".
>
> The following take du'u
> fatci           truth in the absolute
> jetnu           true according to some epistemology
> se djuno        known based on epistemology (but may not be true
>                     by other epistemologies - and the knower may
>                     be aware of this)
> se jinvi        opined based on grounds
> se krici        believed based on no grounds
> The following takes text or sedu'u
> bridi           proposition text

We can start a discussion on truth and cognition, but it's not
pertinent to what has been discussed so far.

> I won't go so far as to say that single ce'u predicates are in effect
> putting zi'o in the unfilled places (which is NOT the LOjbanic
> assumption), but the way you are talking about ka seems that way to me.

Empty places not filled by ce`u are filled with zo`e which minimally
entails da. Not zi`o.