Re: knowledge and belief

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

>>    la platon djuno le du'u la sokrates djuno
>>                  le du'u la djan klama le zarci kei fo da
 >>
>>must entail that:
>>
>>    la platon djuno le du'u la djan klama le zarci kei fo da

Lojbab:
 >and I disagree.  If "da" is "Socrates observed the event" then that would
>presumably serve as sufficient epistemological grounds fro Socrates to say
>he knows John went.

Is that really a possible epistemology? But in any case, Socrates is
not saying anything. I am the one who is saying that Plato knows that
by some epist. x Socrates knows something.

> But Plato did not observe the event, and might not
>consider Socrates' observation a sufficient epistemology for himself.  If
>he does, then his epistemology is more likely to be the authority of
>Socrates.

I'm confused. You didn't answer a previous comment of mine that
might be simpler to start with. If I say:

        la sokrates djuno le du'u la djan klama le zarci kei ko'a
        Socrates knows that John went to the market by epistemology A.

Does that require me to believe this:

        le du'u la djan klama le zarci cu jetnu ko'a
        That John goes to the market is true by epistemology A.

Or can I believe at the same time that Socrates knows something
by a given epistemology and not believe that that something is true
by the same epistemology. It would be funny if I can say that by
the same epistemology, Socrates knows that John goes to the
market and Plato knows that John doesn't go to the market.

>Lojban does not presume that all peopl accept the same epistemoilogies as a
>basis for knowledge.  Indeed, we even have a epistemological marker for
>"I know culturally".  If someone from a culture I know little about says
>that they know something culturally, then I can state that X djuno Y fo loi
>Z kulnu.

Yes, but then you'd be commited to {Y jetnu loi Z kulnu}, or wouldn't you?

co'o mi'e xorxes


co'o mi'e xorxes