Re: knowledge and belief

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:

> The difference (to me) between my opinions and
>my knowledge is that my opinions cover those things where my own means
>of knowing (epistemology can be a whole system/theory of knowledge or it
can
>be a specific-to-this-bridi-theory, in which case it is more like the
"means
>of knowing") do not give an objective truth value, and usually also do not
>provide certainty.

So you agree that if I say {mi djuno ko'a}, then that entails that
I think {ko'a jetnu}? That's at least something. Did I interpret
your words correctly?

Now what about in other than the first person? If I say {la djan
djuno ko'a}, do I need to think that {ko'a jetnu}, as I would in English?
(Using the same epistemology for both sentences.)

>Fuzzy versions of djuno could also be use to handle
>lack of certainty, but the realm of opinions as non-certain facts tend to
>exclude both faith (where there is no evidence) and the possibility of
having
>certain knowledge.  An opinion is based on evidence or reasoning that has
>unknowns/variables that cannot be accounted for.

Right, but {djuno} is not just {birti}, is it? The x2 of djuno has to be
jetnu,
whereas the x2 of birti need not be.

 >I still think it is important to keep the speaker outof it, because the
>speaker is not a place in the bridi.  This relative-to-tthe-speaker
semantics
>reminds me of the come/go distinction, which we fused into one brivla as
well.

Ok, change the speaker to the context. The context in which the djuno
assertion is made has to be such that the respective jetnu assertion
(same predicate, same epistemology) also holds.

co'o mi'e xorxes