Re: knowledge and belief

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>        la sokrates djuno le du'u la djan klama le zarci kei fo le nu viska
>        Socrates knows that John goes to the market by having seen him.
>
>        la sokrates jinvi le du'u la djan klama le zarci kei fo le nu viska
>        Socrates thinks that John goes to the market by having seen him.

jinvi is better translated as "opines", making it clear that the x2 is an
"opinion".  This allows us to continuie to keep theunmentioned speaker
out of the bridi's meaning.  The difference (to me) between my opinions and
my knowledge is that my opinions cover those things where my own means
of knowing (epistemology can be a whole system/theory of knowledge or it can
be a specific-to-this-bridi-theory, in which case it is more like the "means
of knowing") do not give an objective truth value, and usually also do not
provide certainty.  Fuzzy versions of djuno could also be use to handle
lack of certainty, but the realm of opinions as non-certain facts tend to
exclude both faith (where there is no evidence) and the possibility of having
certain knowledge.  An opinion is based on evidence or reasoning that has
unknowns/variables that cannot be accounted for.

I still think it is important to keep the speaker outof it, because the
speaker is not a place in the bridi.  This relative-to-tthe-speaker semantics
reminds me of the come/go distinction, which we fused into one brivla as well.

lojbab