Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Don:
> la .and
> >> For any expression f by a is true only if the metaphysics M used by a
>  evaluates
> >>  to true.  That is any expression is f is a function of M and M is a
 function
>  of
> >>  a: f (M (a)).
>
> >Are you using normal syntax here? I have tried but failed to parse &
> >understand it.
>
> K.
>
> f is an utterance (e.g. 'ti mlatu')
> a is the expressor of the utterance ('mi')
> M is a metaphysics that is used to evaluate the truth of the expression (a's
>  brain)
>
> To evaluate if f is true, we need the metaphysics under which the utterance is
>  made that is f is a function of M.  Again, the metaphysics is dependent upon
>  the who expressed the utterance that is M is a function of a.
>
> Giving, f (M (a)).

I understand. It's not quite right, though, is it? We're concerned
with propositions rather than utterances, and not every proposition
is an (independent) utterance. Yet all propositions have some kind of
truth-value.

> >> >      ge ko`e mlatu gi ko`a djuno le du`u ko`e mlatu
> >> This is false.
> >It cannot be false. It is true *by definition*.
> >> Only 'djuno' is evaluated using the expressor metaphysics M (a).
> >>   The 'du'u' subexpression does not need to be evaluated to determine if
 the
> >>  knowee knows it, there must be only an epistemology to say how it is
 known.
> >I am not sure what you are talking about. {Djuno} as defined in the
> >quote above, or as defined by some other definition? I suppose you
> >don't mean the former, since what you say is obviously incompatible
> >with it.
>
> 'djuno' as defined in the gi'uste, i.e. without a place for the metaphysics of
>  x2 (returning to the point that something is true only by having a
 metaphysics
>  under which to evaluate it).

This appears to be where Jorge and I on the one hand are opposed to
you and Lojbab on the other. J & I contend that the gi`uste is
equally compatible with true-x2 and lite-x2 definitions (though it is
compatible with lite-x2 only if djuno does not actually mean "x1
knows x2 about x3 by epist x4", of course, but rather "x1 believes x2
about x3 by epist x4").

The J-& case is threefold.

Firstly, the mere *absence* of a syntactic sumti place does not in
the least constrain meaning.

Secondly, it would seem by your argument that even lite-x2 djuno
should have an x5 for the metaphysics by which x2 is, in x1's belief,
true.

Thirdly, on the true-x2 version, there is no need for a metaphysics
x5, because the metaphysics is the same as for the whole djuno
proposition.

> > According to the true-x2 version of {djuno}, {djuno ko`e} would be
> > true by metaphysics M only ko`e is true by metaphysics M.
> >
> > Actually, I'd better spell it out more fully and accurately:
> >
> >true-x2 version of {djuno} [current version]:
> >    1. epistemology x4 convinces x1 that P
> >       P: x2 is true about x3 by a certain metaphysics
> >AND 2. P
>
> The crux.  The baseline does not imply clause (2).

It "implies" it, by using "know"; that much has been agreed. But we
have also agreed that the actual wording of the gi`uste is
non-defining.

So, taking that into account, the gi`uste implies neither true-x2 nor
lite-x2.

There are various factors that influence our choice between true-x2
and lite-x2, and I am somewhat agnostic about which is preferable.

> > Clauses (1) and (2) are true by the same metaphysics, though this is
> > not necessarily the one you are calling M(a), which I take to be the
> > one obtaining at the level of the illocutinary act.
>
> Clause (1) is true under the metaphysics of the expressor, M (a).

And what about when Clause (1) (in conjunction with (2)) is embeded in a
larger proposition? What's the metaphysics then?

> There is no
>  other metaphysics M' under which to evaluate (2).  That is why it is
 necessary
>  to introduce 'jetnu' for this purpose.

You seem to be implying that this is a refutation of what I said. But
if it is, I can't see how.

You say "There is no other metaphysics M' under which to evaluate
(2)", but why does that matter, since I said that clause (2) is
evaluated by the same metaphysics as (1), namely "M(a)"?

> With your scheme, does not it become impossible to say that someone else knows
>  something that you disagree with:
>     .i la bil. djuno ledu'u la santas. claus. klama kei folenu te cusku
> Bill knows Santa Claus is coming by the epistemology that someone told him so.

Quite so. Well... - I assume you are speaking loosely, for of course it
would still be possible to say that sentence, but it would be believed by
the speaker to be untrue. (I say this because some people tend to
take these "impossible to say" locutions literally, rather than a
convenient metaphor.)

>  This would be evaluate to true under the baseline,

Only if the baseline includes the contents of Lojbab's head as well
as what's there in black and white.

--And.