Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>>xusra is more akin to cusku than it is to any discussion of truth.
>
>The main difference between {xusra} and {cusku} is precisely the
>truth component, isn't it?

No.  The difference is the "claim". lo se xusra are that portion of lo se cusku
which are "claimed", not that portion which are "true".  The reason for
including the word "true" in the gismu definition is clarity in English as to
what it means to "claim" something.  So that people don't go using "xusra"
to claim their lost jewelry at a lost and found office.  Same with the use of
"true" in djuno, to keep it straight from other English ways to "know".

>> I can opine something as being true regardless of
>>the metaphysics (or in spite of the metaphysics).
>
>I thought you had said that you could not conceive of something
>being true regardless of the metaphysics.

Arrgh, English is too difficult to argue in when someone is trying to logically
analyze every word you use.

I meant this time that I can opine something is true without considering
any particular metaphysics to apply.  Which is not to opine that it is true
under any metaphysics someone could conceive of.  "regardless" here meant
more like "zu'i" whereas in the other location it meant "roda".

>>This then correlates back to true-djuno which I understand as being
>>x1 djuno le du'u x2 jetnu metaphysics x5 kei about x3 under epistemology x4
>
>Only if you want to make the metaphysics explicit. As in the case of
>xusra and jinvi, neither version of djuno requires an explicit metaphysics
>place.


The existence of a palce in the place strutures refers to whether the place is
essential to the concept, not whether one wishes it to be explicitly stated
inany bridi.  There are several gismu which have places that Isuspect will
almost never will be explicitly filled.  But they are part of the place
structure because without them the concept would imply that that component
was not necessary to its meaning.  This then opens the door to even more of
those semantic games that you are playing with klama and cinba.

If there is no metaphysics place, and we are dealing with a "truth", then
that truth MUST be presumed to be truth-in-the-absolute.

>What would be the difference between asserting that something is
>truth-in-the-absolute and asserting that it is true. I.e. what is the
>difference between:
>
>            mi xusra le du'u ti mlatu
>            I assert that this is a cat.

The claims in this sentence are that you asserted "ti mlatu".

> mi xusra le du'u fatci fa le du'u ti mlatu
>            I assert that it is a fact that this is a cat.

The claim in this sentence is that you asserted that
"ti mlatu" is a fact, i.e. is true under all metaphysics.

The former says nothing about metaphysics.

>Again, kanxe is about conjunction, and not
>>about truth.
>
>Of course, but the point is that it involves truths without involving
>metaphysics, which makes perfect sense, just as something can
>involve cats without involving metaphysics.

But kanxe only involves "truths" because I don't know a way to clearly define
conjunction without using the word "true".  Not because it says anything about
 "truths" itself.

>When we say that x1 is true iff x2 and x3 are both true, we are taking
>for granted that there are things that can be true.


Not necessarily.  If everything is false then x2 and x3 are false which means
that x1 is false and we remain consistent.  I am not sure that anyone in
English would call it a conjunction to join two false statements into one
false statement.  And I have no idea how everything can be fasle if you
have a contraictory negation particle, anyway.  But then I have little
imagination.

>With your definition of djuno that is true. What we are arguing at this
>point is whether a definition of djuno with true-x2 is possible at all.
>You are arguing that we can't even create a lujvo with the place
>structure "x1 knows truth x2 about x3 by epistemology x4".

with x2 being "fact" I have no problem.  If you mean x2 being a jetnu
and merely omitting the metaphysically necessary metaphysics place, then this
is like using zi'o to remove the x1 of klama.  It is mechanically possible
but I have no idea what it means.

>>*I* am not asserting x2; I am asserting something about
>>the relationship between x2 and x1, x3, and x4.
>
>Right. Under the above definition you'd be asserting:
>
>-that x1 is a person or other entity capable of cognition
>-that x2 is a true proposition, that it can be arrived at by x4, that
>  it is believed by x1, etc.
>-that x3 is the subject of x2
>-that x4 is way that leads to truths, that x1 used that way to arrive at x2,
>etc.
>
>That relationship is indeed possible, even if it is not the one you
>intended for {djuno}.

I have NO idea what youi mean by "x2 is a true proposition" as distinct from
"x2 is a proposition" in that description UNLESS you tell me whether it
means lo fatci (in which case no metaphysics need apply) or it is lo jetnu
(in which case a metaphysics MUST apply).  I know of no other possible meaning
for "true" that makes it semantically meaningful in that phrase.  If neither
of those applies then you could have said:
<-that x2 is a proposition thatcan be arrived at by x4 ...

lojbab